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EUROPEAN UNION
TERRORISM

SITUATION

AND TREND

REPORT

2025



EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2025

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FOREWORD



Catherine De Bolle
Executive Director of Europol

Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a persistent and multifaceted threat to the security of the European Union and its citizens. Driven by geopolitical tensions, accelerated by digital interconnectivity, and fuelled by ideologically diverse movements, these threats are becoming increasingly complex, reminding us that the threat of terrorism within the EU is neither static nor distant.

Against this backdrop, I am pleased to present the 2025 edition of the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU TE-SAT). This flagship annual publication offers a comprehensive situational overview on terrorism across EU Member States. Produced by Europol in close cooperation with EU Member States and our international partners, the EU TE-SAT is an essential instrument for informing policymakers, guiding operational response and reinforcing our collective efforts to counteract this ever-evolving threat.

In 2024, the terrorism threat in the EU was once again shaped by developments beyond EU borders. The conflict in Gaza and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continued to amplify violent extremist narratives, driving radicalisation and mobilisation within the EU. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria marked another significant shift with potentially greater geopolitical and security implications in the medium and long-term.

The involvement of minors and young people in terrorism and violent extremism was a worrying development that continued to grow in 2024. Mental health problems, social isolation and digital dependency were key enablers of radicalisation among youth. Another key concern was the continuous exploitation of artificial intelligence and other innovative technologies, enabling new possibilities in recruitment, propaganda, modus operandi and financing tools. These advanced technological enablers are transforming the threat landscape, challenging conventional counterterrorism and law enforcement responses.

Adding to these challenges, is the growing intertwining of individuals' digital and physical lives—the "on-life" reality—where online radicalisation seamlessly translates into real-world violence. There is a multiplicity of online communities where radicalised individuals, desensitised to harm and suffering, are drawn in visualising, exchanging and perpetrating violent acts. These communities overlap ideologically, connecting jihadist terrorism to accelerationism, producing a hybridisation of the traditional ideologies – thus creating increasing challenges in their identification and categorisation within contemporary terrorist frameworks.

In the face of this evolving and interconnected threat landscape, Europol and its partners remain firmly committed to reinforcing international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. We will further strengthen partnerships and explore new pathways for innovation in our counterterrorism response. Finally, I would like to reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the victims of terrorism and their families. The EU TE-SAT 2025 reinforces that commitment and underlines our determination to continue to protect European citizens and values.

INTRODUCTION

The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) 2025 is a situational overview, which presents aggregated figures and describes the major developments and trends in the terrorism landscape in the EU in 2024.

This situation report is based on both qualitative and quantitative information provided by the Member States on terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions, and penalties for terrorist offences. Furthermore, Europol's cooperation partners also provided valuable qualitative information, which helped the contextualisation of developments occurring outside the EU that may influence the security of the Union and its citizens. Information on convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences, as well as on amendments to national legislation on terrorism, was provided by Eurojust.

According to EU Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism¹, which Member States had an obligation to transpose into their national legislation by 8 September 2018², terrorist offences are *“criminal acts carried out with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation”*. The EU TE-SAT identifies and elaborates on various forms of terrorism motivated by different ideologies³, such as jihadist, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism. The report also includes a chapter that explores those forms of terrorism which are not attributed to a specific ideology.

In spite of the existence of different legislative frameworks at the national level, the Directive (EU) 2017/541 establishes an EU-wide benchmark concerning the definitions of offences and related sanctions in counter-terrorism and provides a harmonised definition of terrorist offences. On this basis, the EU TE-SAT provides statistical data on terrorist attacks, arrests and convictions in Member States. At a national level, the legislation pertaining to terrorism varies within the limits set by the aforementioned Directive, as Member States are afforded a certain degree of flexibility in their legislative processes. Consequently, the quantitative analysis presented in the EU TE-SAT reflects Member States' definitions of terrorist offences according to their national legislation. It should be noted that these definitions may be broader in scope than the definitions set out in Directive (EU) 2017/541, although they cannot be limited.

While the primary scope of the EU TE-SAT is to present the situational picture on terrorism, the report also includes descriptions of specific violent extremist incidents, acts, activities and developments, reported by the Member States. While the quantitative overview of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties does not include instances of violent extremism, the latter is included in the report for contextualisation purposes and to provide a more comprehensive picture of the security threats to the Union.

¹ Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017L0541>.

² Not all Member States were obliged to transpose it into their national legislation. Ireland and Denmark did not do it, due to respective protocols (Protocols 21 and 22 to the TEU and TFEU).

³ The categorisation of the different types of terrorism based on ideology, and their respective definitions, serve the needs of the EU TE-SAT to classify and analyse information from EU Member States' counter terrorism investigations, without having any legal or formal value.

KEY FINDINGS

Quantifying terrorism in the EU in 2024



A total of 58 terrorist attacks (34 completed, 5 failed and 19 foiled) were reported by 14 Member States. 24 of the total attacks were attributed to jihadist terrorism, which marked an increase compared to the 14 reported the previous year. 21 attacks were attributed to left-wing and anarchist terrorism and eight attacks were categorised as other or not specified form of terrorism. There were four separatist attacks and one right-wing terrorist attack reported, all of which were completed.



Jihadist terrorism remained the most lethal, resulting in five victims killed and 18 injured.



449 persons were arrested for terrorism-related offences across 20 Member States. The majority of the arrests were for jihadist terrorism (289), followed by right-wing terrorism (47), left-wing and anarchist terrorism (28) and ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism (27). 58 arrests were made for terrorist offences related to other or not specified forms of terrorism in 10 Member States.



Concluded court proceedings in 16 Member States resulted in 427 convictions and 59 acquittals for terrorist offences.

Developments across the spectrum of terrorism and violent extremism in the EU



The conflict in Gaza continued to have a major impact on the terrorist threat in the EU. There were numerous attacks and calls to violence across the entire ideological spectrum. Online terrorist and violent extremist propaganda instrumentalised the conflict and ignited hatred, with anti-Semitism being a common denominator in both. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine was another driving factor for the spread of violent extremist narratives, radicalisation and mobilisation.



In their search for support and new recruits, terrorist groups are targeting vulnerable individuals, especially minors and people affected by psychological vulnerabilities. The number of minors and young people involved in terrorist and violent extremist activities across the EU continued to grow in 2024. Mental health problems, social isolation and digital dependency were highly instrumental in the radicalisation of these young people. The terrorist threat interconnects with a growing variety of online communities recruiting minors and young adults to perform extreme violent acts against themselves and others, where leaders advocate for the collapse of democratic societies through terror, chaos, and violence. Many of these online groups have ideological overlapping, connections with jihadist terrorism, violent right-wing extremism and especially accelerationism, but also satanism and occultism, generating a hybridisation of the traditional forms of terrorist ideologies.



Terrorists and violent extremists continued to exploit a multiplicity of technologies, showing different levels of know-how - ranging from mere reproduction and sharing of violent extremist content to actual production of AI-generated material, use of immersive technologies and advanced digital financing tools. The use of generative-AI to create and disseminate propaganda and hate speech has reached unprecedented levels, especially in the right-wing scene. Cryptocurrencies continued to be exploited for terrorism financing, and have also become crucial in the “digital hawala”, the digital adaptation of the traditional hawala system.



In Syria, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December 2024 and the formation of a government led by the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marked a significant shift with potential greater regional geopolitical implications in the medium and long-term. Concerns are growing around the new leadership’s ability in fighting terrorism, reports of radicalised violent extremists expressing their willingness to travel to the region, as well as the uncertain future for thousands of captives held in the prisons and camps now controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). These factors collectively raise increasing alarms about future threats to the EU security.

Focused insights per type of terrorism



The trend of very young people involved in jihadist terrorism-related cases continued, with groups of minors observed to network online, radicalise together and plan attacks. Throughout 2024, both al-Qaeda and Islamic State propaganda continued to instrumentalise the events in Gaza, in an effort to incite attacks and escalate violence. Several coordinated jihadist propaganda campaigns also threatened major events, aimed at inciting supporters to carry out attacks to gain visibility and attract support.



In the right-wing milieu, the very young age of some of the suspects arrested for planning and preparing attacks poses great concerns. One of the main developments is the growing engagement of right-wing violent extremists with online occultist and satanic communities, known as “764” or “Com” networks. In 2024, the number of new online services, along with the exploitation of generative-AI and emerging technologies to create and disseminate propaganda and hate speech, has reached record levels within the right-wing sphere.



Left-wing and anarchist terrorist and violent extremist groups posed varying levels of threat across the EU. The case of the anarchist terrorist organisation “Partnership of Revenge”, with most members lacking ideological affiliation and primarily motivated by financial gain, marked a distinct break from traditional patterns in anarchist terrorist practices.



A significant decrease of ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks was recorded in 2024, compared to the number of violent attacks reported the previous year in Corsica (France).



There was a significant increase in investigations into suspects engaged in other and not specified forms of terrorism. While many of the arrested belonged to anti-government, anti-system and anti-institutional groups, a number of individuals were arrested as suspected of acting on behalf of foreign intelligence services, with the intention of facilitating violent acts in the EU, United Kingdom and North America.

DEVELOPMENTS

Geopolitical developments having an impact on the EU security

The military response by Israel to Hamas' terrorist attack on 7 October 2023 in southern Israel and the news and images of death and destruction that followed in the Gaza Strip continued to have a major impact on the EU internal security throughout 2024. Across the entire ideological spectrum, attacks, calls to violence and terrorist propaganda online instrumentalised the conflict and ignited hatred.

Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) instrumentalised the conflict to escalate tension and call for violence especially targeting Israeli and Jewish targets. The left-wing and anarchist violent extremist spheres across the EU have reignited long-standing anti-Israel sentiments, which at times blurred into anti-Semitic, anti-militarist, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist narratives. A revival of violent propaganda characterised by racism, xenophobia, theories of white supremacy and anti-Semitism also spurred across the violent right-wing scene, especially online.

Alongside the exploitation of the conflict in Gaza by IS and AQ, Hamas and its military wing, the Ezzeddine al-Qassam Brigades, along with Hezbollah and the Yemeni Ansar Allah, have been spreading propaganda in support of the so-called Al-Aqsa Flood.⁴ While this propaganda may not directly incite terrorist violence in the EU, it has the potential to fuel increased hatred towards Israel, promote anti-Semitism and incite calls for retribution in response to Palestinian casualties. This influence contributes to the violent radicalisation of individuals, beyond the traditional follower base of AQ and IS.

EUROPOL COORDINATED THE LARGEST REFERRAL ACTION DAY TARGETING ONLINE HATE SPEECH

In December 2024, Europol's EU Internet Referral Unit coordinated and supported the largest Referral Action Day against online hate speech and incitement to violence targeting ethnoreligious groups online. The international action involved 18 EU law enforcement agencies, who joined efforts to tackle a marked rise in online polarisation, in particular after the terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023 and the military response in Gaza that followed. The soaring amount of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda on digital platforms highlights the need for cross-border police cooperation and collaboration with online service providers (OSPs), as crucial partners in deterring illegal content shared online.⁵

Throughout 2024, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine was another driving factor for the spread of violent extremist narratives, radicalisation and instances of right-wing violent extremists participating in the conflict, fighting from both sides, while others expressed online their desire to travel to the conflict zone. The engagement of violent extremists in the conflict poses concerns about the potential future terrorist threat in the EU, due to these individuals' return with expertise about war tactics and tools and their psychological vulnerability due to the experienced trauma. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has also facilitated the widespread distribution of weapons, which will persist even after the end of hostilities. In a post-war setting, the demobilisation of

⁴ Al-Aqsa Flood (Battle) was the name of the initial terrorist operation launched by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, which later became also the name that Hamas gave to the following confrontation against Israel.

⁵ Europol, December 2024, "Europol spearheads largest referral action against online hate speech", available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-spearheads-largest-referral-action-against-online-hate-speech>

military forces could lead to the diversion of surplus arms into the black market⁶, which might ultimately end up in possession of terrorist and violent extremist groups in the EU.

In Syria, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in early December 2024 and the formation of a government led by the leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marked a significant shift with potential greater regional geopolitical implications in the medium and long-term. Even if HTS and its leader have publicly committed to a peaceful and inclusive transition, the extent to which this commitment will be fully realised remains uncertain. Growing concerns were also raised on the situation's potential to reignite violent extremist and terrorist mobilisation as well as on the new leadership's ability in fighting terrorism. Radicalised individuals from the left-wing violent extremist milieu have expressed support to Syria's new government and some may find motivation to travel to the region and join terrorist groups.

On the other hand, EU nationals currently located in displacement camps may seek to return to the EU. The political situation in Syria may in fact provide an opportunity for IS to free its captive militants and their families (including individuals that pose a threat to the EU), from prisons and camps controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), such as al Hol and Roj, particularly in light of the potential impact of US disengagement from guaranteeing security of camps and prisons in Northeast Syria. IS, which is currently entrenched in Syria's central desert regions and considers HTS not only as apostate but also as a legitimate target, may exploit the current instability to rebuild its strength and expand its influence. Concerns have also been raised with regard to reverberations in the Syrian diaspora communities in Europe and potential tensions between Assad loyalists and supporters of the new Syrian leadership.

In the African continent, IS and AQ affiliates continue to exert control over parts of the Sahel, as well as in Mozambique and Somalia, while in Yemen, Ansar Allah keeps targeting Israeli and Western interests. The overall regional instability may provide additional destinations for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), paving the way for new external operations against the EU.

The growing threat of online communities inciting violence

The number of minors and young people involved in terrorist and violent extremist activities continued to grow across the EU in 2024.⁷ Out of 449 suspects arrested in 2024, 133 aged between 12 and 20 years old⁸, accounting for more than 29 % of the total of suspects arrested for terrorism-related offences. The youngest offender was 12 years old, arrested for planning to commit an attack.

The vast majority of these young suspects were linked to jihadist terrorism (114), followed by right-wing terrorism and violent extremism (12), most frequently investigated for participating in attacks (57)⁹, producing and disseminating propaganda (32), and membership in a terrorist and/or a violent extremist group (17). These young perpetrators were predominantly male¹⁰, they most often underwent a process of self-radicalisation online and were acting dissociated to any centralised organisation, often alone or within small cells of peers. The combination of psychological vulnerabilities, social isolation and digital dependency continued to be instrumental in the radicalisation of young people.

Terrorist organisations continued to target young people, spreading propaganda especially on those social media platforms that are particularly popular among younger users, and adapting content and communication strategies to these platforms and their audiences.

⁶ Europol 2025, EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA 2025), also available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf>

⁷ In 2023, 93 reported suspects were between 13 and 20 years-old.

⁸ Out of 133, 70 were underage (< 18 years old).

⁹ 5 for committing an attack and 52 for planning or preparing an attack.

¹⁰ 12 out of 133 were female.

Algorithms-driven content played a key role in the reinforcement of radical ideas, as the incessant exposure to violent content leads to a dangerous normalisation and general desensitisation to harm and suffering. Immersive environments such as gaming platforms and metaverse also continued to be used for grooming and recruitment of young perpetrators.

Significant drivers in the radicalisation paths of young individuals were social and psychological factors of vulnerability, such as loneliness, social isolation and mental health problems. The search for a sense of belonging is one of the main reasons for these young and vulnerable people to look for online connections, leading to the creation of communities of radicalised youth inciting violence both online and in real life.

A growing variety of online communities recruiting minors and young adults and inducing them to perform extreme violent acts against themselves and others poses serious threats to public safety. The attention toward school shootings rose among minors and young adults, who have been glorifying attacks that happened in other parts of the world and shared information on attackers, their manifestos and even threatened to commit similar acts.

Some recent cases of murders and attacks to passers-by have been linked to the growing threat posed by the rise of a variety of online cult communities leveraging digital platforms to share and normalise extreme cruelty, extort victims and radicalise young individuals into performing acts of violence.

These digital cult communities, known as “764” or “Com” networks, are composed of interconnected groups of individuals who compete to share the most violent content, either perpetrated by themselves or by their recruits. The members of these groups specifically target vulnerable minors (from 8 to 17 years old), identified and groomed on mainstream online platforms and induced, through psychological coercion, into performing acts of self-harm, violence against their circle (i.e., family and friends) and/or even against unknown victims. Such violent acts are later shared within the online community by the same victims who are subjected to threats, blackmailing and other extortion tactics.

Many of these violent online groups have been found to have ideological connections with jihadist terrorism, violent right-wing extremism, especially accelerationism, as their leaders advocate for the collapse of democratic societies through terror, chaos, and violence, spreading ideologies that inspire mass shootings, bombings and other acts of terrorism.¹¹

Besides, nation-based, violent right-wing violent extremist online networks targeting paedophiles (including physically) have boomed in 2024, where minors were groomers and perpetrators of the violent acts.

Emerging technologies

Terrorists and violent extremists continued also in 2024 to exploit a multiplicity of technologies, showing different levels of technological skills - ranging from mere reproduction to actual production of AI-generated material, use of immersive technologies, and advanced digital financing tools.

End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) communication platforms continued to provide secure channels for communication, coordination, recruitment, dissemination of propaganda and incitement to mobilisation and violence. Social media also remained central to terrorist strategies, offering a far-reaching platform and large audiences. Such platforms were also

¹¹ Europol 2025, Intelligence Notification on the Rise of Online Cult Communities Dedicated to Extremely Violent Child Abuse, also available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/rise-of-online-cult-communities-dedicated-to-extremely-violent-child-abuse>

used for sharing instruction manuals and guidelines for explosives and 3D-printed firearms.

Immersive environments — such as gaming platforms and the metaverse — involving virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), remained subject to exploitation within violent extremist circles for propaganda and recruitment, and simulation of attacks in training scenarios.

The use of generative-AI to create and disseminate propaganda and hate speech has reached unprecedented levels, especially in the right-wing scene. Radical individuals are able to generate propaganda items at a fast pace, allowing them to evade content moderation (e.g. via jailbreaking¹²). AI tools, including large language models (LLMs) and deepfake technology enable the creation of persuasive and deceptive content, shared at times in multiple languages and platforms in order to maximise reach.

The use of 3D-printing technology, although not a new threat vector, is still a concern as it facilitates a clandestine manufacturing of firearms bypassing the traditional supply chain and providing a steady internal source of firearms. The increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs /drones) in war settings as well as by terrorist organisations outside the EU, raises further concerns about potential future terrorist threats.

Cryptocurrencies, as well as non-fungible digital assets (NFTs), served as critical tools for anonymous financing, enabling terrorist actors to transfer funds globally while evading traditional financial oversight. Cryptocurrencies have also become crucial in the “digital hawala”, which is the digital adaptation of the traditional hawala system. Digital hawala provides a method of cross-border, pseudo-anonymous transfers through various digital methods (blockchain technology, mobile money etc.), resembling hawala’s physical informal network, while introducing added layers of security.

The integration of these advanced technologies presents a complex and evolving threat landscape, challenging conventional counterterrorism and law enforcement measures alike.

¹² A technique to tamper with a chatbot or a language model with the deliberate intention to obtain illegal or harmful content.

TERRORISM IN EUROPE IN 2024: AN OVERVIEW

Terrorist attacks and arrests


Attacks

58 completed, failed and foiled terrorist attacks in the EU, in 2024

In 2024, 58 terrorist attacks were recorded in the EU, of which 34 were completed, five failed, and 19 were foiled. 24 terrorist attacks were attributed to jihadist terrorism, which marks a significant increase from 14 attacks reported in 2023. Most of them were perpetrated by lone actors (20 out of 24).

14 Member States reported these 58 attacks (completed, failed and foiled). Most of the attacks took place in Italy (20) and France (14), followed by Germany (6), Austria (3) Greece (3), Czechia (2), Denmark (2), Lithuania (2), Belgium (1), Ireland (1), Malta (1), Netherlands (1), Slovakia (1), and Spain (1).

Terrorist attacks (completed, failed, foiled) and arrests for terrorist offences in the EU, 2022-2024 (Source: EU Member States' contributions)



34 completed attacks, five failed and 19 foiled

Five deaths and 20 injured, as a result of six completed jihadist attacks and two attributed to other forms of terrorism

Jihadist terrorist attacks were the most lethal, with five people killed and 18 injured. Six were completed, in France (2), Germany (2), Ireland (1) and the Netherlands (1). 18 were foiled, in France (9), Austria (3), Germany (4), Belgium (1) and Spain (1).

21 attacks were attributed to left-wing and anarchist terrorism, with the majority (18) in Italy (15 of which were completed and three failed), followed by Greece (two completed and one failed).

One right-wing attack (completed) was reported by Italy.

Eight attacks were categorised as other form of terrorism, five of which were completed, one was foiled and one failed. These attacks have been carried out in Czechia (2), Denmark (2), Lithuania (2), and one in Malta and in Slovakia.

Four ethno-nationalist and separatist attacks, all completed, took place in France (3) and in Italy (1).

Most of the attacks targeted civilians (12), eight of which were carried out by jihadist terrorists and three by ethno-separatists; one attack against civilians was categorised as other form of terrorism. The industrial sector was the second most targeted, with nine attacks, all of which were carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorists. Other common targets were private businesses (5), religious entities/symbols (5), critical infrastructure (4), political entities (4), and law enforcement (4). The majority of attacks took place in an urban location (45), while 13 were perpetrated in rural areas.

Arson was the most common modus operandi¹³ (used in 22 attacks), followed by bombing (11), stabbing (8), shooting (6), damage to property (6), and one case of kidnapping. Fire accelerators were used in the majority of attacks (15) and most frequently by left-wing and anarchist terrorists (11), followed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 10 attacks, bladed weapons (used in 10 jihadist attacks), and improvised incendiary devices (IID), which were used in six attacks.

Arrests

A total of 449 persons were arrested for terrorism-related offences across 20 Member States, an increase compared to 2023 (426) and 2022 (380). The majority of arrests were carried out in Spain (90), France (69), Italy (62), Germany (55).

Most of the arrests were for jihadist terrorism (289), a decrease compared to 2023 (334). There were 47 arrests for right-wing terrorism, an increase compared to 2023 (26). More arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorism (28) were carried out in comparison to 2023 (14). For ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, the arrests (27) were higher compared to 2023 (25). The number of arrests linked to other forms of terrorism doubled (58) compared to 2023 (27).¹⁴

The most recurrent offences linked to the arrests was membership to a terrorist organisation (110), planning or preparing an attack (107), and creation and/or dissemination of terrorist propaganda (90).

The arrested suspects were predominantly male (405), while 43 were female.¹⁵ The youngest arrestee, charged with planning or preparing an attack, was 12 years old and was ascribed to right-wing ideology.

¹³ Modus operandi was reported for 54 attacks (out of 58).

¹⁴ In 2024, the arrests for other types of terrorism and non-specified forms were calculated jointly, while in 2023 the figures were reported as separate – 18 attributed to other forms of terrorism and 9 to not specified form of terrorism.

¹⁵ The gender has been specified for 448 out of 449 arrestees.


275 individuals arrested for terrorism-related charges were EU citizens and 174 were non-EU citizens. Out of the total, 22 arrestees had both EU and non-EU citizenship.¹⁶

Terrorist attacks (completed, failed, foiled) and arrests for terrorist offences in the EU per type of terrorism, 2022-2024 (Source: EU Member States' contributions)



¹⁶ The citizenship was specified for 443 out of 449 arrestees.


Terrorist arrests and attacks (completed, foiled and failed) per Member State in 2024
(Source: Member States' contributions)



Concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences

16 EU Member States informed Eurojust about court proceedings for terrorist offences that were concluded in 2024.¹⁷ These court proceedings resulted in 485 convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences.¹⁸

Number of convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences in 2022, 2023 and 2024, as reported to Eurojust¹⁹



The highest number of convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences in 2024 were reported by France, Austria and Belgium (133, 64 and 62, respectively). Some convictions and acquittals pronounced in 2024 are final, while others are pending judicial remedy, as appeals have been submitted by the prosecution, the defence counsel or both.²⁰

¹⁷ Eurojust received contributions containing information on terrorism-related convictions and acquittals in 2024 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. The concluded court proceedings in Hungary include a case in which a person was convicted in first instance but passed away before the court of appeal could rule on his appeal leading to the termination of the proceedings.

¹⁸ Please refer to the Annex for further statistical information.

¹⁹ The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective EU TE-SAT reports, with the exception of the data for Denmark for 2022, which has been amended at the request of the Danish authorities.

²⁰ Due to the specifics of reporting, some EU Member States submit information on final decisions only, while other EU Member States report also on not final decisions. In case a judgment pronounced in 2024 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final judgment.

Number of convictions and acquittals in the EU Member States per terrorism type (2024)
 (Source: Eurojust)



Type of offences in concluded court proceedings

Most of the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2024 concerned membership or participation in (the activities of) a terrorist group, or providing support or collaborating with such a group. Other offences included financing of terrorism, recruitment, providing or receiving training for terrorist purposes, murder in a terrorist context, incitement or threatening to commit terrorist acts, (preparation to commit) terrorist attacks, dissemination of terrorist propaganda, or glorification of terrorism. In some of the concluded proceedings, charges for terrorist offences were brought together with charges for weapons or explosives-related offences, core international crimes, document forgery, or other offences. Some persons convicted of terrorism in 2024 were previously convicted of terrorist or other offences.

Membership/participation in (the activities of) a terrorist group

In December 2024, the Lisbon Court of Appeal upheld the convictions of two brothers found guilty of participation in a terrorist organisation. The two were members of Islamic State's Al Hisbah Religious Police and the Al Amniyah Information Service in Iraq before they travelled as refugees via Türkiye and Greece to Portugal in 2017. On their online account profile, the Portuguese authorities found hundreds of propaganda videos, which were collected by a self-styled resistance group called 'Free men of Niniveh'. One of the brothers was identified in one of the videos. Both were sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and expulsion from the national territory. In addition, one of the brothers was given another 13 years and 4 months of imprisonment for the commission of a war crime and aggravated threat, and ordered to serve a total of 16 years in prison.

(Preparation of) terrorist attacks

In December 2024, the Higher Regional Court of Vienna rejected the appeal submitted by three persons against their conviction by the Regional Court for Criminal Matters of Vienna in April 2024 for facilitating the terrorist attack committed on 2 November 2020 in Vienna. The three assisted the attacker by providing him with the weapon, ammunition and fake documents, helping him in selecting the place of the attack and encouraging him to commit the attack. Two of the accused were sentenced to lifelong imprisonment and the third one was sentenced to two years of imprisonment. Earlier in 2024, the Higher Regional Court of Vienna had also upheld the lifelong imprisonment of another person accused of murder and other offences, who had assisted the perpetrator of the 2020 attack.

Also in December 2024, the Paris Court of Assises ruled in the case of eight persons tried in relation to their role in the murder of a teacher that was committed by an 18-year-old male in October 2020. Two friends of the killer, accused of providing logistical support, including to buy weapons, were convicted of aiding and abetting a murder in a terrorist context and sentenced to 16 years of imprisonment. An Islamist activist and the father of one of the teacher's students, who, among others, engaged in the online campaign against the teacher, were given 15 and 13 years of imprisonment. Four other accused were handed prison sentences of one to five years for glorification and provocation of terrorism, some partially or fully suspended.

Financing of terrorism

In April 2024, the National Court in Spain convicted three non-EU citizens of financing of terrorism and sentenced them to prison terms of five years. One of them received an additional penalty of 18 months for document forgery. The three men had internet contacts with persons linked to IS and sent money to Syria via the hawala system in order to facilitate the return of foreign terrorist fighters to the EU. A fourth co-accused was acquitted of the terrorism charge and convicted of document forgery. The decision of the court was appealed but the appeals were rejected in July 2024.

Cumulative prosecutions for terrorism and core international crimes

In December 2024, the Regional Court of The Hague sentenced a female returnee from Syria to 10 years of imprisonment after it found her guilty of participation in IS, enslavement as a crime against humanity, promotion of crimes with a terrorist objective, and keeping a minor in a helpless condition by taking him to a war zone. Following her radicalisation, the accused left for Syria with her young son. There, she married an IS fighter and had three more children with him. Before divorcing her husband and eventually been held in a detention camp, she lived in several houses in Syria and Iraq. In one of the houses, the accused took advantage of an enslaved woman and ordered her to do household tasks. The diminished responsibility and the stay in Kurdish detention camps were taken into consideration by the court when deciding on the severity of the penalty against the accused.

Recruitment and indoctrination

In February 2024, the National Court in Spain convicted two men of recruitment and indoctrination and sentenced them to serve seven and a half years of imprisonment. The men, already serving prison terms for terrorist offences, tried to influence other inmates to retain their jihadist ideology, to remain united and determined to continue the armed jihad upon their release from prison. They sent messages and letters with IS symbols and other jihadist content and sought the radicalisation of fellow Muslims in the prison. The conviction of the two was upheld in June 2024. A third co-accused was acquitted in February 2024.

Public incitement to terrorism and dissemination of terrorist content

In February 2024, the Metropolitan Court of Appeal in Hungary upheld the first instance judgment against a man sentenced to two years' imprisonment by the Budapest Regional Tribunal in January 2023. The man recorded on a music sharing platform to support jihad, uploaded and shared nasheeds²¹ with radical content produced by IS media, mainly praising the terrorist organisation and inciting terrorism. In private conversations on E2EE platforms, he expressed sympathy for the use of terrorist methods and identified himself as a supporter of IS.

Convictions and acquittals

All concluded court proceedings related to terrorist offences reported by Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden in 2024 resulted in convictions. Some of the defendants acquitted of terrorist offences were found guilty of other criminal offences, including participation in an organised crime group, weapons related offences, violation of bank laws, murder, document forgery, etc.²²

Similar to 2023, all concluded court proceedings concerning left-wing and anarchist terrorism in 2024 resulted in convictions. The proceedings concerning ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism resulted in convictions of 98 % of the accused, and those concerning jihadist terrorism resulted in convictions of 88 % of the accused. Right-wing terrorism-related proceedings concluded with a conviction rate of 86 % of all accused.

Penalties

The average prison sentence for terrorist offences in the reported court proceedings concluded in 2024 was six years, which is similar to 2023.²³ The prison sentences ordered

²¹ A nasheed is a form of vocal music that is popular throughout the Islamic world, typically performed without musical instruments, and covering a wide range of themes, both religious and traditional.

²² Eurojust considers it one verdict if a person is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence and acquitted of another offence. If a person is acquitted of a terrorist offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as acquittal of terrorism.

²³ For the purpose of the calculation of the average prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years of imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years, unless the court has indicated a specific number of years to be served. In the cases where the court ordered a possibility of parole after a certain number of years have been served, those years are included in the overview.

by courts in EU Member States for terrorist offences in 2024 ranged from two months to life imprisonment.

Prison terms of up to five years continued to be the most common penalty for terrorist offences (69 %). Penalties of ten or more years of imprisonment were given to 16 % of those convicted of terrorist offences. It should, however, be taken into consideration that the severity of the penalty in each case would depend on the respective offence and specific circumstances and cannot serve any comparative purposes.

In some cases, the court ordered the suspended execution of (parts of) the penalty for a period of time or in its entirety, under specific probation conditions. In some other cases, the court established the guilt of the accused persons but postponed the ruling on the penalty. Other penalties were also ordered in addition, or as an alternative, to the prison sentences. Those included community service, fines, psychiatric treatment or correctional education. In many cases, the court imposed restrictions on exercising certain civil and political rights, expulsion from the national territory, fixed probation period upon release, involvement in a de-radicalisation programme, ban on the exercise of public service, compensation to victims, withdrawal of citizenship, etc.

JIHADIST TERRORISM

Key findings

- ▶ **24** jihadist terrorist attacks were reported in the EU, marking an increase compared to 14 in 2023. Six were completed: in France (2), Germany (2), Ireland (1) and the Netherlands (1). 18 attacks were foiled. Jihadist terrorism was again the most lethal in the EU, with 18 victims injured and five killed.
 - ▶ **289** individuals who follow a jihadist-Salafist ideology or who are associated with it, were arrested for terrorism-related offences, in 19 Member States. Most arrests occurred in Spain (78) and France (58).
 - ▶ **320** individuals were convicted of jihadist terrorism offences in the EU in 2024.
- ▶ In 2024, several coordinated propaganda campaigns threatened major events, aiming at inciting supporters to carry out attacks, to gain visibility and attract support. Several foiled jihadist plots were targeting mass events, including the Olympic Games in Paris in May, the UEFA European Football Championship in June and July, and a concert in Vienna in August.
 - ▶ The trend of very young individuals involved in jihadist terrorism-related investigations continued in 2024. Groups of minors were observed to network online, radicalise together and plan attacks. The majority of these young individuals were supporters of the Islamic State (IS) but seemed to remain largely separate from the established jihadist movements and with limited knowledge of jihadist ideology.
 - ▶ Radicalisation in prisons and the release of former terrorist convicts also continued to be a major concern for EU Member States.
 - ▶ Both al-Qaeda and Islamic State propaganda continued to exploit the events in Gaza throughout 2024, in an effort to incite attacks and escalate violence, especially against Israeli and Jewish targets. An IS campaign titled ‘Kill Them Wherever You Find Them’ was referred to in claims for attacks by various IS branches throughout the year.
 - ▶ Social media and messaging applications remained the main vehicles to spread terrorist audio-visual content by radicalised individuals, showing different levels of technological expertise, ranging from reproducing and sharing existing content to creating AI-generated material.

JIHADIST TERRORISM DEFINED

For the EU TE-SAT, jihadism is defined as a violent sub-set of Salafism, a revivalist Sunni Muslim movement that rejects democracy and elected parliaments, arguing that human legislation is at odds with God's status as the sole lawgiver. Jihadists aim to create an Islamic state governed exclusively by Islamic law (shari'a), as they interpret it. Unlike other Salafist currents, jihadists legitimise the use of violence by referring to the classical Islamic doctrines on jihad, a term that literally means 'striving' or 'exertion', but which jihadists treat as religiously sanctioned warfare. All those who oppose jihadist interpretations of Islamic law are considered as 'enemies of Islam' and therefore considered legitimate targets. Some jihadists include Shi'a, Sufis and other Muslims in their spectrum of perceived enemies.

Jihadist terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties

Jihadist terrorist attacks

In 2024, 24 jihadist attacks were reported by EU Member States, of which six were completed and 18 were foiled. The six completed attacks were reported by France (2), Germany (2), Ireland (1) and the Netherlands (1), resulting in 18 victims injured and five killed.


All completed attacks were perpetrated by lone attackers, neither directed nor instructed by a specific terrorist group. The six completed attacks were carried out using unsophisticated and easily accessible weapons such as knives in Germany (2), France (1), in Ireland (1) and the Netherlands (1), and a rudimentary incendiary device in France (1).

Of the 24 attacks, both completed and foiled, only the one in Solingen (Germany) was claimed by the self-proclaimed IS terrorist group.

18 attacks were foiled, respectively in France (9), Austria (3), Germany (4), Belgium (1) and Spain (1). 14 of the foiled attacks were believed to be plotted by individuals acting on their own. One case involved an individual residing in France suspected of receiving instructions by alleged supporters of IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) located in Afghanistan. In another plot foiled in Belgium, one 18-year-old and three minors were suspected of communicating online among each other about the preparation of an attack.

Several foiled plots were targeting mass events, including the UEFA European Football Championship in June and the Olympic Games in Paris (France), in May and July, and a mass concert in Austria. Other foiled attacks were aimed at law enforcement, religious targets (in particular Jewish) and also private businesses.

Jihadist terrorist attacks (completed, failed, foiled) in EU Member States, 2022-2024
(Source: Member States' contributions)



Jihadist terrorist attacks in the EU, 2022–2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)²⁴

	2022	2023	2024
Completed	2	5	6
Failed	0	0	0
Foiled	4	9	18
Total	6	14	24

On 23 August 2024, in Solingen, Germany, a male sympathiser of IS attacked visitors to a city festival, repeatedly and deliberately stabbing them in the neck and upper body with a knife. Three people died and ten others were injured, some of them seriously. IS claimed responsibility for the attack and published a video in which the perpetrator pledged allegiance to IS.²⁵ The perpetrator had been in contact with an unknown IS member since August 2024 through a messenger service. This individual encouraged him and assured the perpetrator that IS would claim responsibility for the attack and use it for its propaganda.²⁶

On 15 August, in Galway, Ireland, a 16-year-old man approached a vehicle departing a military barracks and stabbed the (male) driver in the arms, chest, face and stomach.

On 19 September, in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, a knife attack occurred near the Erasmus Bridge, killing one person and wounding another. The attacker, a 22-year-old man, was arrested on suspicion of a terrorist act. The investigation conducted so far provides indications that the suspect may be ideologically driven. The investigation is ongoing at the time of writing.

In Europe but outside the EU, two significant incidents motivated by jihadist ideology occurred.

On 2 March 2024, in Zürich, Switzerland, a 15-year-old male attacked an orthodox Jew with a knife, injuring him severely. The perpetrator was arrested at the scene. He had announced the attack on social media the day before. In the afternoon before the attack, the accused made a video in which he pledged allegiance to IS and announced that he would kill as many 'infidels', particularly Jews, as possible. Additionally, he called on the Muslim community to commit acts of violence against Jews and Christians. Furthermore, the accused addressed the Swiss federal government (Federal Council), accusing it of participating in the fight against IS. The attacker posted the video on social media just before committing the acts. During the attack, he started a livestream that was watched by several people. IS used the attacker's videos for propaganda purposes.

On 29 June 2024, in Belgrade, Serbia, a police officer performing security duties in front of the Israeli embassy was attacked by an individual using a crossbow, injuring him severely. The attacker was killed by another police officer in self-defence. An administrator of several social media groups advocating 'jihad' was charged with membership of a terrorist organisation for having maintained daily contact with the perpetrator.

²⁴ The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective EU TE-SAT reports.

²⁵ Europol information.

²⁶ German Federal Prosecutor-General's press release, 27 Feb 2025, <https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/Pressemitteilung-vom-27-02-2025.html>.

Arrests for jihadist terrorism-related offences

In 2024, 289 arrests were categorised as linked to jihadism, which shows a decrease compared to 2023 (334). Almost half of all arrests occurred in France (58) and Spain (78). 258 arrestees were male, and 30 were female.²⁷ Six female suspects were arrested for preparing or planning an attack.

Arrests for jihadist terrorist offences in EU Member States, 2022–2024

(Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Austria	16	18	22
Belgium	22	67	25
Bulgaria	1	1	0
Cyprus	0	0	8
Czechia	0	0	3
Denmark	4	1	1
Finland	1	0	3
France	93	62	58
Germany	30	39	37
Greece	0	2	1
Hungary	0	1	1
Ireland	4	9	1
Italy	21	14	14
Latvia	0	1	2
Malta	0	0	3
The Netherlands	21	18	23
Poland	0	1	1
Romania	4	2	1
Slovakia	0	1	0
Spain	46	78	78
Sweden	2	5	7
TOTAL	266	334	289

²⁷ The gender of one suspect arrested in Latvia was not specified.

More than one third of the suspects arrested on jihadist terrorism charges were below the age of 20, while the average age was 27.²⁸ 62 suspects were minors, aged between 13 and 17 years old, arrested for charges including planning attacks.

In addition to the suspects involved in completed or foiled terrorist attacks, just below half of all individuals arrested were accused of either membership of a terrorist organisation (in the majority linked to IS) or terrorist propaganda. Around a quarter was charged with planning or preparing attacks. Terrorist propaganda offences concerned individuals that were found to express jihadist terrorist views online and downloaded and disseminated material produced by terrorist media outlets, some without being directed by or integrated into identifiable terrorist organisations.

Concluded court proceedings for jihadist terrorist offences

In 2024, the largest number of convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences were pronounced in relation to jihadist terrorism (363 in total). Convictions and acquittals were pronounced across the whole EU, with the majority in France, Belgium and Austria (112, 61 and 60, respectively).

In September 2024, the Court of First Instance of West-Vlaanderen-Brugge convicted four persons for their role in the planning of a terrorist attack in Belgium. Possible targets of the attack included a LGBTQ+ bar, a police station, and a NATO building. The leader of the group pledged allegiance to IS and shared guides on how to make explosives, raised funds and recruited others to join IS. He was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. His wife, brother and another co-accused were given prison terms of four to eight years. The fifth co-accused was acquitted.

Terrorism and related activities

Groups, structures and individuals

The trend of minors and young people involved in jihadist terrorism-related investigations continued in 2024. These young terrorist actors were primarily active online. Most radicalised in private online networks that had no apparent hierarchical structures, in interaction with likeminded and geographically dispersed individuals. They displayed a high security and anonymisation awareness in their use of the digital environment.

On 18 March 2024, a 14-year-old female individual inspired by IS was arrested in Austria on suspicion of planning to commit a terrorist attack using bladed weapons in Graz. She was in contact with other radicalised German-speaking individuals, with whom she discussed her plans. Her intention was to attack people whom she considered to be 'unbelievers'.

The majority of these young individuals were supporters of IS, with some pledging allegiance to IS in video messages that they shared with their online contacts.

In August 2024, in Austria, a 19-year-old male individual was arrested on suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack. He was ideologically inspired by IS but was not involved with the group on a structural or personal level. He was planning to kill a large number of people in a suicide attack at a mass concert in Vienna. When the plot was foiled by law enforcement, the individual was in the process of preparing explosives for the attack.

²⁸ The age was reported for 287 arrested suspects out of 289.

In December 2024, in Vienna, Austria, a 21-year-old male individual was arrested on suspicion of plotting an attack. He appeared to be in contact with members of IS via online messengers. He was planning an attack on police or the Jewish community in Vienna. The weapons used would have been either explosives or knives.

Groups of minors were observed to network online, radicalise together and plan attacks. Other minors were arrested for terrorist propaganda, including for administering terrorist online channels and exploiting gaming platforms for self-training.

In June 2024, two underaged males were arrested in the Netherlands in two separate cases. One was an administrator of an online pro-IS channel. He also searched for information on joining IS abroad and he wanted to acquire weapons online. The other suspect is accused of preparing a terrorist attack. He allegedly used a gaming platform to prepare himself and 'practice' the attack.

Young radicalised individuals generally seemed to remain largely separate from the established jihadist movements, had limited knowledge of jihadist ideology and were attracted by online violent content, also stemming from other forms of extremism (especially right-wing). In some cases, terrorist cells formed around spiritual leadership personalities, allegedly in contact with terrorist organisations abroad.

In March 2024, four individuals were arrested in Tyresö (Sweden) on suspicion of conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence in Sweden, which is alleged to have links to IS Somalia. Two of them were members of a known criminal gang. The group changed the intended target over time, varying between Jewish interests and 'infidels' in general. In April, the 60-year-old imam of a mosque in Tyresö was arrested on suspicion of being in contact with members of the IS Somalia and recruiting young people. Another arrest in June at Stockholm Arlanda Airport targeted an individual who was intending to leave Sweden and join IS Somalia.

Activities and events

Throughout 2024, the news and images of death and destruction in Gaza resulting from the military response by Israel to the Hamas terrorist attack in October 2023, continued to be exploited by terrorist groups like AQ and IS in an effort to incite attacks and escalate violence, especially against Israeli and Jewish targets located in the EU.

Radicalisation in prisons and the release of former terrorist convicts also continued to be major concerns for EU Member States.

On 17 July 2024, in La Ferté, France, a radicalised former detainee released the previous month and claiming to be an 'IS soldier' attempted to assassinate a taxi driver. He initially intended to target members of the Jewish community around the synagogue of Le Mans. The perpetrator was arrested a couple of days later.

Terrorism-related travel

Outbound travel of radicalised individuals for terrorist purposes, including for military training, from the EU to the Middle East and Africa (especially Somalia) remained on a low level in 2024, while still being discussed in radicalised circles of all ages. Some individuals were found to be in contact with members of IS via chat groups or similar platforms, where trips for training purposes were proposed and facilitated. Few investigations on returnees from conflict zones in the Middle East were reported.

On 11 and 18 June 2024, respectively, in Paris, France, a 17- and a 20-year-old were arrested, as they intended to carry out attacks against the Palais de l'Elysée, the Israeli

Embassy in Paris, or during the Olympic Games. One of the two individuals also wanted to go to Palestine to fight there.

IS affiliates' control over parts of the Sahel, as well as in Mozambique and Somalia, provides potentially new destinations for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) wishing to join IS in a conflict zone and might pave the way for new external operations against the EU.

Propaganda

In 2024, 80 individuals were arrested for disseminating jihadist propaganda. A majority of these were supporting IS (including ISKP). Social media and messaging applications continued to be the main tools used to spread terrorist audio-visual content by radicalised individuals, in many cases very young and self-indoctrinated, showing different levels of technological expertise, ranging from some only able to reproduce and share existing content to others able to create AI-generated material.

Both AQ and IS propaganda tried to fit the crisis in Gaza in 2024 into their narratives. As IS considers Hamas to be an 'apostate' movement, it promoted a narrative focusing on a more general war between Islam and 'unbelievers'. In early February, the IS spokesman released an audio message in which he called for attacks worldwide in response to the conflict in Gaza in a campaign titled 'Kill Them Wherever You Find Them', which was referred to in claims for attacks by various IS branches throughout the year. AQ tried to fit the conflict in Gaza into its anti-Western terrorist narrative and positioned itself as the global defender of Muslims, rather than focusing on the ongoing conflict. The liberation of Palestine remains one element in AQ's long-term project of establishing an Islamic state after forcing the West out of the Muslim world.

IS Narrative/Media

In 2024, the volume of new propaganda material published by the global IS network remained on a low level. IS continued to publish claims for attacks carried out by its branches ('provinces'), especially in Africa, in its weekly Arabic newsletter al-Naba'. Its A'maq News outlet produced statements and videos. However, the IS central leadership issued only two major video productions and two audio recordings of its official spokesman, but no statement by its global leader.²⁹

MAJOR TAKEDOWN OF IS' ONLINE PROPAGANDA NETWORK DISRUPTS GLOBAL TERRORIST COMMUNICATIONS

In June 2024, a major international operation, coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, with the support from European and United States' law enforcement authorities, dismantled the I'LAM Foundation – an important online media infrastructure linked to IS. I'LAM created, operated, and supported websites and communication channels used to disseminate propaganda and incite terrorism globally. The network broadcasted content via radio stations, social media and a news agency, promoting IS in over 30 languages. Its technological infrastructure was sophisticated, which made its full traceability more difficult. Servers were taken down in Germany, the Netherlands, United States and Iceland, with the Spanish authorities arresting nine radicalised individuals. Europol contributed with forensic intelligence and expert analysis, to map the web infrastructure and support the judicial proceedings.

The small volume of new propaganda material was partially compensated by the activities of pro-IS media outlets, particularly al-Azaim Media, which is affiliated with ISKP. These outlets produce original propaganda and re-mediate official IS propaganda in alternative formats, often dissecting long speeches and written articles in one-page posters, more palatable for social media users. The main narrative that IS and pro-IS

²⁹ The fifth 'caliph' since the declaration of IS' 'caliphate'.

propaganda are trying to spread is that the IS global network is expanding, instrumentalising the terrorist attacks carried out in Europe – either directed or inspired by IS – and the glorification of lone actor terrorists, inciting the audience to follow their example.

In 2024, several coordinated propaganda campaigns threatened major events, aiming at inciting supporters to carry out attacks against attendants at these venues and terrorising the Western audience. However, these campaigns largely failed.

Al-Qaeda Narrative/Media

AQ terrorist propaganda was predominantly issued by its regional affiliates rather than the central leadership, which published only one statement in 2024, commenting on the conflict in Gaza, while regional AQ affiliates took the lead in spreading propaganda. The most active in 2024 were the Somalia-based al-Shabab al-Mujahidin Movement and the Sahel-based Jabhat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), followed by Ansar al-Shari'a, the local denomination of the Yemen-based AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

A new propaganda format by AQAP: the 'Inspire Tweets'

Among regional AQ affiliates, only AQAP embraced a strategy of promoting global terrorism while experimenting with a new propaganda format called 'Inspire Tweets', emulating the posters disseminated by pro-IS media outlets, albeit on an inferior level – both quantitatively and qualitatively. These 'Tweets' consist of pictures with a short text, excerpts from Osama bin Laden and AQ strategists or comments on the situation in Palestine, easily re-posted by social media users or in microblog apps.

Financing

A large number of arrests were related to collecting and providing funds to IS and its affiliates. In several cases, the funds were destined to family members in detention camps in north-eastern Syria. In some cases, the beneficiaries of the funds were also other terrorist groups in conflict areas.

A 30-year-old male was arrested in Barcelona (Spain) in January 2024. He was linked to an international network whose members are alleged to have transferred funds to persons located in Syria and Türkiye through a complex structure that involved the use of cryptocurrencies to avoid money laundering controls and ensure anonymity. This international network was run from Idlib (Syria) and was allegedly linked to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Funds continued to be raised through both legal and illegal sources. The most frequent sources included legitimate income, and online donations and crowdfunding campaigns. For transferring funds, small amounts and a mix of methods continued to be used, including banking transfers, informal value transfer systems (IVTS), hawala, transfers via online banking, as well as cryptocurrencies, which became common in digital hawala.

Situation outside the EU

In 2024, conflicts and geopolitical instability, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, continued to fuel transnational jihadist narratives with effects felt globally. Within the regions, economic hardship and climate-driven displacement continued to fuel recruitment. The conflict and continued escalation of violence in the Middle East was a driving factor for the radicalisation of individuals in 2024.

Western Balkans

A terrorist attack was perpetrated in Serbia in 2024 (described in the chapter [Jihadist terrorist attacks](#)). On 16 December 2024, in North Macedonia, four members of a terrorist organisation, self-proclaimed as affiliate to IS, were arrested. The four suspects established the terrorist group at the beginning of 2024, with the aim of committing terrorist attacks against civilians and public infrastructure. They attempted to acquire weapons and produce IEDs, and shared IS propaganda on a popular E2EE platform, which they translated to recruit new members.

Online incitement to jihadist terrorism, especially on social networks, continued to be a matter of concern in some Western Balkan countries. Recruitment to violent extremism also occurred offline, in informal circles or mosques, targeting mainly young individuals of low socioeconomic status. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the crises in the Middle East, in particular Israel's military actions in Gaza, were observed to be driving factors in radicalisation in the Western Balkans.

Türkiye

In Türkiye, IS Türkiye Province claimed responsibility for a small arms attack on a Catholic church in Büyükdere, on 28 January 2024, stating that the attack was perpetrated as part of IS' global 'Kill Them Wherever You Find Them' campaign. Türkiye reported that perpetrators of IS-linked attacks or plots are mostly radicalised online. In February 2024, nine individuals were arrested in Istanbul on charges of supporting ISKP members travelling from Iran.

Syria

In Syria, the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the takeover by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham constituted a major geopolitical upheaval, with potentially significant effects in the medium and long-term. The presence of jihadists linked to war crimes in the new government and military, raises serious doubts about the willingness and ability of the new Syrian authorities to detach themselves from their jihadist past, and to protect all citizens, including minorities.

Although the central IS 'provinces' in Iraq and Syria remained weakened, some of their affiliates in other regions continued to expand. Concerns remained around the resurgence of IS in Syria at the time of writing. There are concerns around the security provisions related to the detention camps in Northeast Syria, which hold captured fighters (including EU nationals), and their potential uncontrolled release in the event of an escalation of military confrontation or of US withdrawal (see the [Geopolitical developments chapter](#)).

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, ISKP was still able to claim responsibility for a number of attacks in 2024, despite the pressure by the Taliban. These included an attack in Bamiyan on 17 May 2024, which killed four tourists. Propaganda issued by or in support of ISKP was clearly tailored towards Central Asian nationals. In particular, ISKP appears to have established an effective model of reaching out to and engaging Central Asian population abroad and diaspora (especially in Türkiye and Russia).

East Africa

In East Africa, despite a military campaign that evicted the IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) out of many of its strongholds, ISCAP continued to represent a major threat to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and regionally. IS reported a large number of attacks against Christian villages and Congolese security forces.

IS central media extensively promoted its seemingly resurgent IS Mozambique Province (ISMP) over 2024, which carried out numerous attacks in the northern Cabo Delgado

province, mostly targeting a Christian majority population and often allegedly in response to IS' global 'Kill Them Wherever You Find Them' attack campaign.

While large parts of Somalia continued to be controlled by the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab, IS Somalia continued to consolidate its stronghold in the north-eastern Puntland region of Somalia, reportedly with the help of IS fighters from the region and North Africa. IS Somalia plays a critical role in IS' wider network, as it serves as a logistical and financial hub.

West Africa

In West Africa, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the IS Sahel Province (ISSP) continued to expand and govern territory in their respective areas of operation. The tri-border region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger remained the epicentre of both ISSP and JNIM activity and clashes between the groups, particularly in Mali. JNIM – and to a lesser extent ISSP – are slowly moving south, towards Togo and Benin. Another IS affiliate, ISWAP, operates in the Lake Chad Basin areas of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Key findings

- ▶ **1** right-wing terrorist attack was completed in Italy in 2024.
 - ▶ **47** suspects were arrested in 10 Member States for right-wing terrorist offences, the majority in Italy (15). The most common offence was planning or preparing an attack (24).
 - ▶ **24** individuals were convicted of right-wing terrorism-related offences in the EU in 2024.
- ▶ The threat posed by right-wing terrorists and violent extremists across the EU was characterised by a blend of transnational online networks, lone actors (albeit often inspired or guided by online networks), and a few structured offline groups.
 - ▶ The most common profile of right-wing violent extremists active online was of young males, often minors, often suffering from mental health problems. The very young age of some of the suspects arrested for planning and preparing attacks poses great concerns for Member States.
 - ▶ In the digital environment, accelerationist ideas were still at the forefront, paired with the highly concerning growing engagement of right-wing violent extremists being active within occultist and satanic (online) communities, known as “764” or “Com” networks. There, the right-wing violent extremist ideology is surpassed by satanic narratives, often combined with doomsday-focused accelerationism.
 - ▶ The incessant growing number of new online services and the tendency to tapering content moderation have contributed to maintaining the volume of propaganda significantly high. The use of generative-AI and emerging technologies to create and disseminate propaganda and hate speech has reached unprecedented levels. A persistent interest in weapons and explosives materialised in a number of seizures, with an increasing popularity of 3D-printed firearms.
 - ▶ The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine was a recurring theme in right-wing violent extremist narratives, radicalisation and mobilisation. Terrorist attacks and school shootings that happened in other parts of the world and the various political elections also catalysed most of the online propaganda.

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM DEFINED

Violent right-wing actors (groups or individuals) seek to use violence to transform the entire political, social and economic system into an authoritarian model, rejecting democratic order and values and fundamental rights. Violent right-wing ideologies use narratives centred on exclusionary nationalism, racism, xenophobia and/or related intolerance. A core concept of right-wing violent extremism is supremacism or the idea that as a group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture, etc.), they are superior to all others and consider it to be their natural right to dominate the rest of the population. In addition, right-wing violent extremist ideologies feed on a variety of hateful sub-cultures, that often oppose diversity in society and equal rights of minorities, such as misogyny and hostility towards LGBTQ+ communities and anti-immigration attitudes.

Right-wing terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties

Right-wing terrorist attacks


One right-wing terrorist attack was carried out in Italy in 2024.

On the night of 18 March 2024 in Montello, Italy, a man has attempted to set a fire at the entrance of an Islamic centre. Statements against the presence of the Islamic centre and threats against the mayor were found in a public area nearby. The man had no known affiliation to any terrorist organisation.

Right-wing terrorist attacks in the EU 2022-2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Completed	1	0	1
Failed	0	0	0
Foiled	3	2	0
Total	4	2	1

Right-wing terrorist attacks (completed, failed, foiled) in EU Member States, 2022-2024
 (Source: Member States' contributions)



Arrests for right-wing terrorist offences

In the EU, 47 persons were arrested for right-wing violent terrorist offences in 2024. This is an increase from 26 arrests in 2023, but in line with the 46 arrests made in 2022.

The 47 arrests were made across 10 Member States, with the vast majority in Italy (15). Arrests were also made in France (8), Germany (8), the Netherlands (7), Hungary (3) and Belgium (2). Czechia, Denmark, Latvia, and Slovakia reported 1 arrest each.

On 4 December 2024, in Bologna, Italy, 12 individuals were arrested as part of a neo-Nazi, denialist and supremacist subversive group active on E2EE platforms. The arrested individuals were planning hostile actions against Italian government bodies and aimed to build an ethno-state governed according to the principle of racial purity.

Arrests for right-wing terrorist offences in EU Member States, 2022-2024
(Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Austria	1	0	0
Belgium	0	12	2
Czechia	0	0	1
Denmark	2	0	1
Finland	0	2	0
France	16	4	8
Germany	11	1	8
Hungary	0	0	3
Ireland	4	1	0
Italy	6	4	15
Latvia	0	0	1
Netherlands	3	5	7
Slovakia	2	2	1
Spain	1	0	0
Total	46	31	47

All arrested suspects were male and had EU citizenship. The youngest arrestee was 12 years old and the oldest was 76 years old.

In Hungary, a 13-year-old male was charged with planning or preparing an attack. He was a member of an online group following right-wing violent extremist ideology, where he posted that he intended to perpetrate an attack in May in Hungary.

The oldest arrestee in 2024 was a 76-year-old male who was charged with planning or preparing an attack, as well as membership of a terrorist organisation. He also possessed illegal firearms.

Planning or preparing of an attack was the most common offence in 2024, reported in 24 arrests for right-wing terrorism.

In July 2024, a 22-year-old male was arrested and charged with planning or preparing of an attack. The individual had created a multitude of E2EE channels, in which calls for racial hatred and violence against non-white individuals and ultra-left activists were

disseminated, as well as contact information of "enemies and traitors". Publications related to the manufacturing of explosives were also posted. Furthermore, the individual encouraged users to share online photos of their actions and victims. Several posts called for disrupting the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. He was subsequently sentenced to two years' imprisonment with a warrant of custody.

Membership of a terrorist organisation was the primary offence in eight arrests and was also listed as a secondary offence in other 15 arrests.

In November 2024, the German Police arrested eight persons, suspected of being members in a terrorist organisation, which was formed in 2020. It is a militant group of 15 to 20 individuals whose ideology is characterised by racist, anti-Semitic and partially apocalyptic ideas. Its members are united in a profound rejection of the liberal democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany. The organisation believes that Germany is nearing its collapse and that the government and society will implode. On that occasion, the group intends to gain control over certain areas in Saxony and potentially in other states in Germany by force of arms to establish governmental and societal structures inspired by National Socialism.

Terrorist propaganda was the primary offence in seven arrests.

In September 2024, Latvian authorities arrested a male, who systematically engaged in public glorification and justification of terrorism on a communication platform. He also distributed materials containing glorification, justification and invitation to terrorism, e.g. video recordings of terrorist acts, as well as instructions for making explosives and weapons. Moreover, the person was involved in the administration of several international communication groups, promoting hostile attitudes and violence against various minorities.

Four arrests were made for the committing of an attack.

In March 2024, four men (aged 22, 23, 25 and 26) were arrested in France in connection with the 11 November 2023 attack in Lyon, where around 40 ultra-right-wing militants, armed with blunt objects, iron bars and pyrotechnic devices had attacked a community centre, where a conference on Gaza was taking place. Several people attending the conference were injured.

Incitement and making threats were the primary offences in four arrests.

In August 2024 three males, 16, 19 and 26 years old were arrested in the Netherlands during a nationwide investigation and charged with incitement to a terrorist offense. They were active in accelerationist online communication groups. The 16-year-old is also suspected of membership of the terrorist organisation The Base. The 19- and the 26-year-old arrestees were also charged with the illegal possession of firearms.

Concluded court proceedings for right-wing terrorist offences

Convictions and acquittals for right-wing terrorism-related offences decreased in 2024 (28 compared to 44 in 2023). Right-wing terrorism-related court proceedings were concluded in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Slovakia.

In October 2024, the Criminal Court of Paris sentenced a French citizen to 5 years of imprisonment after he was found guilty of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, glorification of terrorism and weapons related offences. The man managed a website selling books glorifying Nazism and fascism and inciting to racial hatred and supremacist right-wing terrorism. He was also the leader of an extreme right-wing group and was actively sharing online supremacist materials and promoting violent

actions and terrorism. The online component of his activities was considered as an aggravating factor by the court.

Terrorism and violent extremism

Groups, structures and individuals

In 2024, the threat emanating from right-wing terrorist and violent extremist actors across the EU remained multifaceted, characterised by a blend of transnational online networks, lone actors (albeit often inspired or guided by online networks), and few structured offline groups. Specifically, within the online sphere, accelerationist ideas are still at the forefront.

In many cases, the profiles of the right-wing violent extremists identified in the online environment were of young males, often minors, frequently suffering from mental health problems. Besides, many showed a high incidence of personal struggles such as familial dysfunction, problematic interactions, social exclusion and other socio-economic challenges, which often served as a catalyst for their violent behaviour.

These individuals habitually shared a fascination for weapons and explosives, various violent ideologies and mass shooters. The sense of social isolation leads often to a "lone-wolf" mentality, with no direct connection to organised groups but still driven by the same underlying psychological problems and grievances. Such grievances are not against specific persons, but against society in general, which they see as oppressive or unresponsive to their needs. For them, the internet becomes a virtual refuge where they can find a sense of belonging and validation.

Terrorism-related travel

Travel among right-wing violent extremists and terrorists primarily revolved around the participation in gatherings such as music concerts, sports events and training, commemoration marches, demonstrations and lectures.

In particular, an international neo-Nazi music network, Blood & Honour, plays a key role in the promotion of this ideology through the organisation of music events across the EU. All these events also serve as important networking and recruitment opportunities as well as to foster solidarity and ideological reinforcement among right-wing violent extremists. These events demonstrate the transnational nature of the EU-wide right-wing violent extremist movement.

In 2024, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine was a recurring theme in violent right-wing violent extremist narratives, radicalisation and mobilisation. Instances of right-wing violent extremists participating in the conflict were reported, fighting for both sides, and a few others expressed online their desire to travel to the conflict zone. These individuals' return with expertise about war tactics and tools and their psychological conditions may pose future terrorist threats. As the war has also facilitated the widespread distribution of weapons, in a post-war setting, some could ultimately end up in possession of terrorist and violent extremist groups in the EU.

Propaganda and radicalisation

In 2024, a high volume of propaganda content was created and disseminated online. It was built on ideologies and ideas like accelerationism, neo-Nazism, white supremacism

and a combination thereof. Notably, in 2024 there was a substantial increase of online propaganda that combines violent right-wing extremism, child sexual abuse material (CSAM), esoterism, occultism and satanism.

Notwithstanding the constant counter-terrorism efforts, the incessant growing number of new online services and the recent tendency to tapering content moderation have contributed to maintaining the volume of propaganda significantly high. Channels where propaganda is distributed remain quite diverse in nature and purpose, with the most common being social media, messaging applications and discussion fora. The use of messaging apps was widespread in 2024, also thanks to the emergence of a multiplicity of E2EE communication services that guarantee a high degree of anonymity. Mainstream platforms and chatbots continued to be exploited by violent extremists who resort to practices like jailbreaking to circumvent moderation efforts.

The use of generative-AI and emerging technologies to create and disseminate propaganda and hate speech has reached unprecedented levels. The ease with which users can generate propaganda items, the fast pace at which such items can be edited and shared and the resources available to shield moderation efforts represent a threefold challenge when tackling terrorist content online.

A large quantity of online propaganda in 2024 was related to past terrorist attacks and their perpetrators, including livestreams of the event(s), footage screenshots, photographs of the attackers and manifestos. The attention toward school shootings occurred outside the EU also rose especially among EU minors and young adults, who have been sharing information on perpetrators, their manifestos and even threatening to commit one themselves.³⁰

Other violent events that took place in 2024 steered online propaganda. In particular, the Crocus City Hall attack (Russia, March 2024), the Southport stabbings (United Kingdom, July 2024) and the Eskisehir mosque stabbing (Türkiye, August 2024) catalysed the attention of online violent extremists, who repeatedly underscored the need for action.

The numerous political elections that took place in 2024 substantially influenced the topics and flux of online propaganda. In particular, campaigns preceding the 2024 European Parliament election and the United States presidential election were characterised by a high degree of polarisation and by the presence of many online groups and networks repeatedly threatening to resort to violence, should the elections not be won by the supported candidate or political party. At the same time, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, xenophobic and anti-LGBTQIA+ rhetoric swarmed online.

A relevant portion of online propaganda was linked to events of different nature like music concerts and festivals, themed fairs, sports events, marches and demonstrations, accompanied by fundraising efforts. Nation-based, right-wing violent extremist networks targeting paedophiles have also soared online, with minors involved as groomers and perpetrators.

In 2024, the tackling of online propaganda in the fight against terrorism was also marked by the designation of The Base as a terrorist organisation³¹, which has affected the volume of propaganda circulated by the group. Nevertheless, its members continued to promote initiatives, raise funds and disseminate propaganda. Similarly, the proscription of the Terrorgram Collective in the United Kingdom (2024)³² seems to have resulted in a decrease of the amount of propaganda linked to the group and circulating online, while the group itself has not produced any new publication since 2023.

³⁰ Europol information.

³¹ Under the EU Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP). Council of the EU Press Release <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/07/26/sanctions-against-terrorism-council-renews-the-eu-terrorist-list-and-designates-a-new-entity/>

³² By the United States and Australia (2025).

Activities and events fuelling extremism with a potential to violence

A persistent interest of right-wing violent extremists in weapons and explosives materialised in a number of seized firearms, including those produced via 3D printing, in multiple cases. Those firearms frequently appear not to be solely intended for attacks, but part of a particular lifestyle that evolves around self-defence, martial arts and survival skills.

The popularity of 3D-printed firearms continued to increase. Firearm procurement remains a major topic also online. Right-wing violent extremists in the EU have sometimes been found to engage in weapons trafficking, while concerns over potential weapons trafficking from the war zone in Ukraine persist.

A highly concerning development was the increase in right-wing extremists being active within occultist and satanic online communities, known as “764” or “Com” networks (see [The growing threat of online communities inciting violence](#)).³³ In this context, the right-wing extremist ideology is surpassed by satanic narratives, often combined with doomsday-focused accelerationism. Migration remains also key in the discourses among transnational right-wing extremists all over the world.

Financing and nexus with organised crime

In 2024, no large-scale violent extremist and terrorist funding operations were detected. Right-wing violent extremist and terrorist groups relied on a variety of methods to finance their activities, attract supporters and further their ideological objectives. Funds were also used to cover the costs of organising demonstrations, travel expenses, legal fees and to support violent extremists facing financial hardships.

These groups engaged in a range of both legal and illegal activities, blending traditional fundraising methods with modern digital tools. One primary financing means was through the organisation of cultural events, such as conferences, music concerts, and sports activities. Concerts featuring Rock Against Communism (RAC) music are a notable example of such gatherings, where proceeds from ticket sales, merchandise, and donations are funnelled into supporting the groups’ activities.

Membership fees, donations from supporters, and sale of propaganda items/material remain key methods of fundraising. Books, clothing, and branded products are often sold online. Several groups have also expanded their fundraising methods to include cryptocurrencies. Some groups have been linked to illicit activities and organised crime, in particular drug trafficking or extortion. This blend of legal and illegal financing allows for a diverse and resilient financial structure.

Situation outside the EU

Although EU right-wing violent extremist groups have always held contacts with like-minded groups, mostly from neighbouring countries, in the last years there is an increasingly international component linked to the right-wing ideology. This is particularly evident with transnational accelerationist online networks, which have gained momentum and continued to expand. With English as the most common language, right-wing violent extremists establish and nurture extensive online contacts all over the world, focusing on topics such as migration and conflicts happening in other regions.

³³ The Com is a virtual community of groups and individuals who conduct illicit activities that glorify serious violence, cruelty, and gore. Elements of the “764” or “Com” networks are known to have extreme ideological views and victimise children, coercing them to commit violent acts against themselves and others. Many of these groups have neo-Nazism, nihilism, and paedophilia as its core principles. More information available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/law-enforcement-targets-online-cult-communities-dedicated-to-extremely-violent-child-abuse>

LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Key findings

- ▶ **21** left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks were carried out in the EU, most of them (18) in Italy. 17 attacks were completed, and 4 failed.
 - ▶ **28** arrests were made in connection with left-wing and anarchist terrorism, an increase compared to 2023 (14) and 2022 (19). Most arrests were made in Greece (20) and Italy (6).
 - ▶ **1** individual was convicted of left-wing and anarchist related terrorist offences.
- ▶ Left-wing and anarchist terrorist and violent extremist groups posed varying levels of threat across Europe. While the overall terrorist threat remained relatively low, some countries have experienced violence in 2024.
 - ▶ The case of an anarchist terrorist organisation, where most of its members lacked ideological affiliation and were primarily motivated by financial gain, demonstrates a distinct break from traditional patterns in anarchist terrorist practices.
 - ▶ Left-wing and anarchist violent extremist groups continued to rely heavily on online platforms to spread their propaganda and recruit new members. In 2024, artificial intelligence (AI) for creating propaganda was reported for the first time within the left-wing and anarchist spheres.
 - ▶ Propaganda focused on international themes, with strong expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian people, the Kurdish cause, the situation in Lebanon, as well as migration, environmental and climate concerns. At local level, campaigns focused on disapproval to NATO or Eurozone membership, opposition to mass events and criticism of police and law enforcement, including doxing campaigns targeting law enforcement officers or right-wing opponents.
 - ▶ Left-wing and anarchist violent extremists maintained a well-established international network, frequently traveling across the EU to participate in demonstrations, international mobilisations and solidarity actions.

LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM DEFINED

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to trigger a violent revolution against the political, social and economic system of a state, in order to establish socialism and ultimately a communist and classless society. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. Anarchist terrorism is a term used to describe acts of violence committed by groups or individuals who promote the absence of authority as a societal model. Anarchists pursue a revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian agenda.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks


In 2024, a total of 21 left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks — both completed and failed — were carried out in two Member States. Of these, 17 were completed, while four failed. Italy reported 18 attacks (15 completed and three failed) and Greece reported three (two completed and one failed).

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in the EU, 2022-2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Completed	13	23	17
Failed	3	8	4
Foiled	2	1	0
Total	18	32	21

There was a decrease in the total number of attacks compared to 2023 (32) but still more than the attacks reported in 2022 (18) and 2021 (1).

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks (completed, failed, foiled) in EU Member States, 2022-2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)



One of the attacks involved a letter bomb sent to a member of the judiciary in Greece, which was successfully neutralised. The rest of the attacks (20) were directed against property, belonging primarily to the industrial sector and private businesses, while critical infrastructure, state institutions, and financial entities were also targeted.

Arson was used in 13 attacks, with fire accelerators employed in 11 attacks and an Improvised Incendiary Device (IID) used in two. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were used in four attacks, while blunt weapons or similar means were used in other four attacks

10 attacks were claimed, nine of them via online statements on dedicated blogs and websites. Among those claimed online, only four included the name of the group or organisation responsible for the attack. The central themes in the rhetoric of terrorist groups, based on their claims of responsibility, revolved around opposition to government policies — particularly on migration — as well as anti-war, anti-militarism,

and anti-capitalist sentiments. Other key themes included resistance to state repression, criticism of the judiciary and prison system, support for the Palestinian cause, advocacy for environmental and animal rights, and solidarity with imprisoned or prosecuted anarchists.

On 12 February 2024, a failed terrorist attack took place in Thessaloniki, Greece. An envelope containing an IED ("letter bomb"), addressed to the President of the Appeals Court, was neutralised at the city's courthouse by the Hellenic Police Bomb Disposal Unit. The investigation revealed that the envelope was delivered to the courthouse by an individual claiming to work for a courier company. Discrepancies in the envelope's stamps and sender details led to further checks, and the IED was eventually detected and safely neutralised. The terrorist group "Armed Response" claimed responsibility in an online post.

Low-cost and unsophisticated means, such as arson and fire accelerators, have once again proven highly effective tactics used by left-wing and anarchist terrorists and violent extremists.

In March 2024, unknown perpetrators set fire to an unsecured high-voltage pylon in the German state of Brandenburg. Nearby villages and an industrial facility producing e-vehicles were affected by the resulting energy shortages.

In September 2024, an arson attack on a warehouse in Tuili, Italy, led to the destruction of 1 960 solar panels. Similarly, in November 2024, an arson attack at a quarry in Carrara, Italy, resulted in two heavy vehicles set on fire, causing financial damage estimated at up to EUR 1 million. While none of the attacks were claimed, law enforcement attributed them to left-wing or anarchist groups, based on the applied modi operandi.

Arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences

28 arrests were made for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences, in Greece (20), Italy (6, including one arrest in Argentina, following an extradition request by Italy), and in Germany (1). In addition, one arrest took place in Spain based on an international arrest warrant issued by the Peruvian competent authorities. Among the arrestees, five were women (aged 30-65 years) and 23 men, aged between 26 and 78 years.

In 22 cases, the primary offense was membership in a terrorist organisation. The other most common offences were participation in the activities of a terrorist organisation and incitement and making threats.

Arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences in EU Member States, 2022-2024
(Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Belgium	1	0	0
Germany	3	1	1
Greece	3	2	20
Italy	12	10	6
Spain	0	1	1
Total	19	14	28

Law enforcement authorities in Greece arrested five individuals in connection with an IED explosion that occurred on 31 October 2024 in an apartment in Athens, which resulted in the death of a male and the serious injury of a female, both inside the apartment at the time of the explosion. The injured female was arrested with other four suspects. All were members of a newly established anarchist terrorist cell. Their activities extended beyond Greece, as in previous years they had lived in and maintained contacts with foreign individuals in Germany and Switzerland, actively participating in violent extremist activities abroad.

Two arrests were linked to terrorist organisations active in the EU in the past.

A known fugitive, member of the Italian terrorist group "Brigate Rosse" ("Red Brigades"), was arrested in Argentina for extradition to Italy after the revocation of his refugee status by the Argentine judicial authorities, obtained in 2004. Additionally, a female believed to be a former member of the terrorist organisation "Red Army Faction" was arrested in Germany based on two arrest warrants, one issued by the Federal Prosecutor and another issued by the Public Prosecutor in Lower Saxony, for attempted murder and a series of armed robberies committed between 1999 and 2016. She is one of three fugitives suspected to have committed a series of robberies between 1999 and 2016 to finance their clandestine lives.

Concluded court proceedings for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences

One court proceeding in relation to left-wing and anarchist terrorism was concluded in 2024.

In November 2024, the Criminal Court of Paris found a Turkish national guilty of financing of terrorism, participation in a criminal conspiracy with the purpose of preparing an act of terrorism and unauthorised possession of weapons or ammunition in a terrorist context. The man, linked to the Communist Party of Türkiye/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML), participated in meetings, disseminated propaganda for recruitment purposes, collected and re-distributed funds and possessed weapons and ammunition without authorisation or declaration. The court sentenced the man to a three-year prison term, the execution of which was partially suspended, and a fine.

Terrorism and violent extremism

Groups, structures and individuals

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist and violent extremist groups pose varying levels of threat across the EU; although the overall terrorist threat remains relatively low, some countries have experienced violence linked to left-wing or anarchist violent extremism in 2024.

In the left-wing terrorist and violent extremist scene, groups are more likely to follow organisational lines with a defined chain of command. Left-wing violent extremists continue to operate clandestinely in small groups, relying on low-tech methods to carry out attacks — usually targeting property or infrastructure rather than individuals. Anarchist terrorist or violent extremist groups can operate autonomously, as part of larger networks, or both. Consistent with the anarchist doctrine, which rejects hierarchical structures, these groups are organised horizontally. Nevertheless, certain individuals may assume informal leadership roles, either through their ideological influence or due to their involvement in violent activities. Connections between groups/cells and individuals are built on ideological affinity and the principle of "solidarity". This is particularly evident between groups in Greece, Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Chile, where they respond to online calls for mobilisation and adapt their propaganda to support transnational campaigns.

In 2024, the case of an anarchist terrorist organisation where most of its members lacked ideological affiliation and primarily were motivated by financial gain, marked significant deviations from established patterns in the left-wing and anarchist scene.

On 27 February 2024, the Hellenic Police Counter-Terrorism Unit conducted an operation across multiple areas in Athens and a number of correctional facilities nationwide, resulting in the arrest of ten individuals accused of establishing and participating in the terrorist organisation "Partnership of Revenge". Four of those charged were already incarcerated for organised crime offences, while two others were members of the Hellenic Army and Naval Forces. In the following months, three additional individuals were arrested for the same charges. The same terrorist group was responsible for sending a letter bomb to a member of the judiciary in Thessaloniki, Greece, on 12 February 2024. The arrestees with a criminal background lacked any ideological affiliation to anarchism and their participation was solely for financial gain, as they were receiving payment for their participation in attacks.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist organisations continued carrying out attacks as part of broader campaigns or calls to action.

An arson attack in November 2024 in Rome, Italy, targeting vehicles in the parking lot of the headquarters of the national railway company, was claimed online by a group as part of the campaign against the "logistics of war". The group also cited inspiration from attacks across Europe targeting the military industry and aligned with the call to action issued by the Balkan Anarchist Book Fair [Call for Transnational days of action against militarism and nationalism from the Balkans - (1st to 10th October 2024)].

Propaganda and recruitment

In 2024, left-wing and anarchist violent extremist propaganda focused on both international and local socio-political issues. On the international front, the narratives centred around themes such as anti-repression, anti-fascism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism, anti-militarism, and anti-authoritarianism. There were also strong expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian people, the Kurdish cause, the

situation in Lebanon, as well as a focus on environmental and climate concerns. At local level, propaganda focused on disapproval to NATO or Eurozone membership, opposition to events like the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, and criticism of police and law enforcement, including doxing campaigns targeting law enforcement officers or political opponents related to the right-wing violent extremist scene. It also addressed issues like support to imprisoned comrades, social justice, the housing crisis, and the domination of technology.

Left-wing and anarchist violent extremist groups continued to rely heavily on online platforms to spread their propaganda and recruit new members. Social media platforms and E2EE apps are used for organising actions, promoting ideologies, and mobilising supporters. In 2024, artificial intelligence for creating propaganda was reported for the first time within the left-wing and anarchist scene— including deepfakes, AI-generated videos, and anti-moderation techniques — along with the growing exploitation of immersive environments like the metaverse and video games to disseminate propaganda and interact securely with young audiences. Left-wing and anarchist violent extremists demonstrated a high degree of operational security by using encryption applications and drives, anonymity-enhancing platforms, VPNs, and the TOR browser.

Groups also distributed physical propaganda material such as posters, stickers, books, and magazines at events, universities, and demonstrations. They also organised offline gatherings such as concerts, rallies, debates, and workshops to further their cause and for recruitment purposes.

Most of the attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist or violent extremist groups in 2024 were relatively low-cost and thus could have been financed either by the perpetrators themselves or through funds collected by the broader left-wing and anarchist networks. Common funding methods included membership fees, personal income (including salaries and unemployment benefits), and donations. Fundraising was often conducted through solidarity events such as concerts, cultural gatherings, dinners, and book fairs.

Additionally, the sale of literature, including books and magazines, and merchandise, contributed to their financial resources. Crowdfunding platforms, in some cases in cryptocurrency, were used to collect donations, particularly for legal expenses and support for imprisoned or fugitive members. International transfers were typically kept small, and cash was often used in order to avoid detection. Funds were also used to cover court costs, prison maintenance, and fines incurred as a result of militant activities.

Activities and events

In 2024, national and international developments often gave rise to calls to action (or “campaigns of struggle”) encouraging left-wing and anarchist violent extremist groups and individuals to carry out attacks against the perceived targets of these campaigns. The confrontation between violent left-wing and anarchist groups and right-wing violent extremists persisted, occasionally resulting in violent clashes.

National campaigns across the EU varied, focusing on state migration policies, national legislation, internal security, the prison regime, anti-fascist and anti-capitalist sentiments and also opposition to the Paris 2024 Olympic Games. Internationally, the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza remained a key driver of pro-Palestine campaigns, which were also linked to the broader anti-militarist movement. Climate and environmental issues continued to be significant concerns within the violent left-wing and anarchist milieu.

A campaign against the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris, France, escalated in violence attributed to the anarchist violent extremist scene in the country. This campaign

included sabotage actions and coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure, with a notable rise in attacks using improvised incendiary devices, primarily aimed at the rail network during the Olympic period, culminating in a coordinated attack with incendiary devices that paralysed a large part of the railway network just hours before the opening ceremony of the Games. Following the attack, an email signed by an "unexpected delegation" was received by various national and foreign press outlets, denouncing the sporting event and expressing hostility towards capitalism and hatred of institutions.

Left-wing and anarchist violent extremists maintained a well-established international network, frequently traveling across European countries to participate in demonstrations, international mobilisations, and solidarity actions, often strengthening ties through meetings, events, and fairs dedicated to left-wing or anarchist causes. These transnational connections facilitate the sharing of strategies and support for imprisoned or deceased comrades.

ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Key findings

- ▶ **4** separatist attacks were completed in France (3) and Italy (1).
- ▶ **27** arrests were carried out in the EU for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences, 15 of which were related to the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK).
- ▶ **53** individuals were convicted for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism-related offences in 2024.
- ▶ A significant decrease of ethno-nationalist and terrorist attacks was recorded in 2024, compared to the number of violent attacks reported the previous year in Corsica (France).

ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM DEFINED

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out a state for themselves from a larger country or annex territory from one country to that of another. Left-wing or right-wing ideological elements are not uncommon in ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks

In 2024, the EU recorded four ethno-nationalist or separatist terrorist attacks, in France (3) and in Italy (1), all of them completed. This is a significant decline from the 70 incidents reported in 2023, all of which occurred in Corsica (France).

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks (completed, failed, foiled) in EU Member States, 2022-2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)



Arson was the primary method used in two of the attacks. Three attacks were reported by France and were committed against properties in Corsica.

On the night of 26-27 October 2024, an unfinished residence in the commune of Prunelli di Fiumorbo was demolished using an improvised explosive device (IED) made from a fire extinguisher.

On 30 December 2024, the gateway to the Departmental Employment Office in Borgo was destroyed in a violent incident. An IED made from a gas cylinder filled with a mixture of potassium nitrate and sugar detonated, completely demolishing the entrance.

There were no foiled or failed ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks reported in the EU.

Arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences

Of the 27 arrests in the EU for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences, more than half (15) were linked to individuals primarily associated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK).

On 26 November 2024, a male was arrested in Rome (Italy) in the execution of an international arrest warrant issued by Germany in 2022 for the crime of participation in a terrorist organisation. The man was known for being an executive of a PKK/KCK cell present in Italy and has participated in financial activities for the PKK in Germany.

Only one arrest was related to the commission of an attack. Eight arrests involved individuals whose primary offence was membership of a terrorist organisation, eight

were for participation in the activities of a terrorist organisation, four for financing, three for planning an attack, two for propaganda activities and one for incitement.

Arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences in EU Member States, 2022-2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Finland	0	0	5
France	0	11	0
Germany	4	1	9
Greece	0	1	0
Italy	2	6	10
Ireland	11	4	0
Spain	1	1	3
Sweden	0	1	0
Total	18	25	27

Concluded court proceedings for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences

Convictions and acquittals for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism-related offences increased in 2024 (54, compared to 27 in 2023). Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism-related proceedings were concluded in Austria, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany and Spain. The majority concerned the groups *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) and *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, others were related to *Resistencia Galega*, the *Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz* (ASMLA) or Corsican groups.

In December 2024, the Danish Supreme Court ruled in the case of three persons prosecuted for financing of terrorism, promotion of terrorism and other offences. Through the ASMLA, the three provided financial and other support to terrorist movements, including such movements in the Ahwaz area, which fought against the Iranian regime in the hope to achieve independence. The three were given prison terms of six, seven and eight years.

Terrorism and violent extremism

Groups and structures

Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK)

The PKK continued its significant presence across the EU, engaging in political advocacy, fundraising, recruitment, and propaganda dissemination. It continued to leverage its networks to sustain operations and influence the Kurdish diaspora. The group's activities blend legal and illegal methods, combining political mobilisation with clandestine financial and recruitment efforts.

The PKK operates through various front organisations and advocacy groups across Europe, lobbying for political recognition and the removal of its terrorist designation. Kurdish Democratic Centres (CDKs) serve as key hubs for PKK activities, organising demonstrations, cultural events, and conferences to promote its political struggle, while simultaneously facilitating recruitment and ideological indoctrination. The PKK continued to actively recruit young individuals from Kurdish communities in Europe, often targeting them during demonstrations and political gatherings. Recruits undergo training in European-based centres before being transferred to military camps in Northern Syria (in support to the YPG) and in Iraq.

Fundraising remained a cornerstone of the PKK's operations in Europe, through voluntary and coerced donations, membership fees, and fundraising events. The annual "Kampanya" donation generates substantial revenue, with estimates indicating that the PKK raises over 30 million euros across Europe each year. These funds support media operations, logistical infrastructure, and armed activities in conflict zones.

The PKK also continued to engage in illicit financial practices such as money laundering, extortion, and fraud. Business owners within Kurdish communities are often pressured into contributing financial support, while underground gambling networks and fraudulent humanitarian donations further supplement PKK finances.

The PKK extensive propaganda network to maintain support and mobilise its base also continued throughout 2024. Kurdish-language media outlets, social media platforms, and print publications serve as key tools in disseminating PKK ideology. The organisation portrays itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Kurdish cause.³⁴

Dissident Republican (DR) groups

DR groups remain active in Northern Ireland despite a general decline in attacks and attempted attacks since 2009. While security measures have successfully disrupted a number of plots, several incidents in 2024 demonstrate that these groups continue to pose a security threat, retain access to firearms and explosives and maintain criminal connections to acquire additional materials.

On 23 February 2024, an explosive device was thrown at Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officers in a rural area. A crude handheld improvised explosive device (IED) that had failed to detonate was later recovered. Additionally, weapons believed to be linked to DR groups were seized, including an assault rifle recovered in Londonderry on 21 May 2024 and an IED found near the Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland border on 9 June 2024.

³⁴ On 1 March 2025, the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been imprisoned in Türkiye since 1999, urged his group to convene a congress and decide to disband and disarm. On 12 May 2025, an official announcement was communicated by a media outlet close to the PKK, formally communicating the disbanding and renouncing to the armed conflict, as part of a new peace initiative with Türkiye, ending four decades of hostilities. While further specific details regarding these peace efforts remains unclear, concerns remain on whether the peace initiative will be actually implemented by the Kurdish armed groups active in conflict zones in Middle East.

The New IRA (NIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA) remain significant threats. The NIRA continues to engage in militant activities and has an established footprint in the Republic of Ireland. Meanwhile, the CIRA, though smaller in scale, remains committed to violent action in pursuit of its goals. DR groups often leverage social media to disseminate their narratives and recruit supporters.

Some groups, such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH), have ceased direct violence but still advocate for a united Ireland. These organisations maintain a presence both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and continue recruitment efforts. Meanwhile, loyalist paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA)³⁵, remain in existence, though their activities are now predominantly criminal rather than paramilitary. They persist in illicit enterprises such as drug distribution, contraband trade, and local community control through intimidation. They have also been vocal opponents of the Northern Ireland Protocol and continue to express concerns over sovereignty issues post-Brexit, fearing an increased push for Irish unification.

DR groups continue to support international causes, particularly the Palestinian cause, a long-standing element of their ideological framework. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza has further fostered their engagement in protests and social media campaigns. However, there is no clear evidence of direct collaboration between DR groups and pro-Palestinian militant organisations.

DR groups persist in efforts to recruit new members, targeting both young individuals and operatives with paramilitary experience. While large-scale recruitment has not been observed, some individuals have been drawn in due to familial ties, perceived self-protection, or financial incentives. Notably, recruitment remains largely face-to-face, with minimal online activity identified.

Financially, these groups continue to generate revenue through contraband sales, counterfeit goods, drug trafficking, and extortion. Additionally, some DR groups engage in fuel laundering and cigarette smuggling, exploiting postal services, air travel, and seaports in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to facilitate illicit trade.

An emerging concern is the use of 3D-printed firearms, which have been observed in Northern Ireland, posing the risk of local paramilitary groups acquiring weapons avoiding trafficking across international borders.

Corsican Separatists

France continued to experience violent extremism in Corsica in 2024, as seen in a number of attacks on property, however on a much lower level than in 2023. The National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) and the Ghjuventù Clandestina Corsa (GCC) remained the main active groups in 2024. However, an investigation in early 2024 led to the identification and arrest of three individuals, resulting in a significant decrease in the number of attacks throughout the year. The GCC's activities mark a shift towards arson as a primary tactic. Corsican separatist-linked criminal activities have expanded, providing additional funding via extortion, intimidation, and financial misappropriation.

³⁵ Both groups are proscribed as terrorist organisations by the United Kingdom and Ireland. In Ireland, they are referred to as "illegal paramilitary organisations".

OTHER AND NOT SPECIFIED FORMS OF TERRORISM OR VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Key findings

- ▶ **8** attacks were perpetrated (six completed, one foiled and one failed), categorised as other forms of terrorism.
 - ▶ **58** arrests were made for terrorist offences related to other or not specified forms of terrorism in 10 Member States.
 - ▶ **28** individuals were convicted of terrorist offences that were categorised as other or not specified form of terrorism in 2024.
- ▶ There was a significant increase in investigations into suspects engaged in other and non-specified forms of terrorism. While many of the arrested belonged to anti-government, anti-system and anti-institutional groups, nine suspects were arrested for acting on behalf of foreign intelligence with the intention of facilitating violent acts in the EU, United Kingdom and North America, such as sabotage acts, transport and detonation of explosive and incendiary devices.
 - ▶ A blend of disinformation, conspiracy theories, anti-establishment and anti-government sentiments, as well as content borrowed by other ideologies (especially right-wing), feature in most of the online propaganda consumed and shared by these individuals.
 - ▶ While the majority of groups are non-violent, some accept or justify violence. Some militants clearly show a potential for violence and others even have engaged in violent acts against authorities and state representatives.

Other terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties

Other terrorist attacks

Other and not specified forms of terrorism attacks (completed, failed, foiled) in EU Member States, 2022-2024 (Source: Member States' contributions)



Six terrorist attacks categorised as other and not specified forms of terrorism were completed respectively in Czechia (1), Denmark (2), Lithuania (1), Malta (1) and Slovakia (1). One attack was foiled in Czechia and one failed attack was attempted in Lithuania. Except for the attack in Slovakia which targeted a political figure and the one attack in Denmark which targeted civilians, all other attacks targeted critical infrastructure and public administration, business and political entities. Arson and bombing were the main modi operandi used in the attacks.

A lone-actor using a firearm targeted the Prime Minister of Slovakia severely injuring him.

On 15 May 2024, a 71-year-old man attempted to assassinate the prime minister of Slovakia by firing five shots at close range with a firearm he legally possessed. The prime minister survived but was seriously injured. The perpetrator was arrested at the scene and later charged by the prosecutor with terrorism offenses. The perpetrator acted alone, allegedly motivated by his dissatisfaction with governmental decisions on media and press, as well as by his financial and health conditions. Following the attack, numerous posts on social media praised it as “just” or “justified”, leading in some cases to criminal prosecutions for incitement to violence.

In Czechia, one completed arson attack was perpetrated by a male who appeared to have been recruited via an online E2EE platform by individuals linked to Russia. The same suspect was planning two additional attacks against private businesses.

In the night of 6 June 2024, an individual broke into a public bus deposit in Prague and attempted to set on fire several buses using flammable liquid in two canisters. Three buses were damaged by the fire. One foiled attack was also linked to the same attacker. Photos of two private businesses in Prague were found in the perpetrator's mobile phone. Detected conversations and geo-localisation data on his mobile indicated plans for other arson attacks.

In Malta, one completed attack with the use of triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was carried out by a lone attacker.

On 30 May 2024, a TATP explosive was detonated outside the Labour Party (the current governing party) by an 18-year-old male who acted alone. No particular ideology was attributed to the attack, despite the suspect's declared aversion for the Maltese government and its policies. The suspect had followed bomb-making tutorials on open-source platforms and had sourced precursor materials from online vendors. He was also discovered to be an adherent of Nazi/fascist online content. Upon his arrest, more explosive material was discovered at a garage administrated by him. Psychiatrists confirmed that he was ill at the time of the incident.

On 29 May 2024, in Copenhagen, Denmark, an arson attack orchestrated by a group of individuals targeted the home of a Jewish woman.

Arrests for other and not specified terrorist offences

In 2024, 58 persons were arrested for terrorist offences related to other forms of terrorism, which shows a significant increase compared to 2023 (27 arrests). The majority of arrests occurred in Italy (17), followed by Poland (12), the Netherlands (10), Spain (8), Denmark (3), France (3), Hungary (2), Czechia (1), Malta (1) and Slovakia (1).

Arrests for other terrorist offences in EU Member States, 2022-2024
(Source: Member States' contributions)

	2022	2023	2024
Belgium	0	4	0
Bulgaria	0	1	0
Czechia	0	0	1
Denmark	1	0	3
France	0	1	3
Germany	25	9	0
Greece	0	2	0
Hungary	0	0	2
Ireland	0	1	0
Italy	0	0	17
Malta	0	0	1
Netherlands	0	5	10
Poland	0	0	12
Slovakia	0	0	1
Spain	0	4	8
Total	26	27	58

In May 2024, in Italy, 17 males were arrested, also in cooperation with Europol, as part of a non-EU criminal organisation active in Italy and Europe. They were arrested for various offences, including criminal association also aggravated by transnationality, association with terrorist purposes (outside the EU), possession of lethal weapons and explosives, international drug trafficking, murder and facilitation of irregular migration.

In 2024, a number of arrests occurred in the Member States linked to other forms of terrorism. Nine suspects, of which eight in Poland and one in Spain, were arrested for acting on behalf of foreign intelligence, with the intention of facilitating the perpetration of violent acts in the EU, the United Kingdom (UK) and North America, especially sabotage acts, transport and detonation of explosives and incendiary devices.

One suspect arrested in Spain³⁶ was recruiting individuals who were tasked to commit sabotage acts in the EU, the UK and North America. Three other male suspects were arrested in Spain as members of a logistical structure belonging to Hezbollah that was responsible for obtaining essential components for the manufacture of drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for that organisation. In a separate incident, two male suspects were arrested in Spain and one in France for their alleged connection with an attempted murder for terrorist purposes.

Other arrests involved individuals planning or preparing attacks against various targets.

On 19 October 2024, two young individuals were arrested while preparing an armed attack on the territory of Hungary during the memorial services to be held for the anniversary of the 1956 uprising. The suspects held conversations in an online group about planning to obtain and use firearms. At the time of their apprehension, one of the individuals had a firearm in his possession, which was earlier legally modified to fire blank ammunition only.

In May 2024, a 26-year-old man belonging to the "incel" movement was arrested by the French local police. He said he wanted to commit mass killings. He claimed his fascination with Elliot Rodger and his aversion to women (priority targets of his murderous project), scheduled for 23 May 2024, the tenth anniversary of the mass killing perpetrated by Rodger in the United States.

Propaganda and recruitment

While the majority of anti-government, anti-system and anti-institutional groups are non-violent, a minority of the identified groups accepts or justifies violence. Some militants clearly show a potential for violence and others even have engaged in violent acts against authorities and state representatives.

Radicalisation, recruitment and mobilisation calls occur largely online, however there are also instances of physical gatherings. Most of the arrested suspects had been consuming and sharing online content involving disinformation, conspiracy theories, anti-establishment and anti-government sentiments, and also content borrowed by other ideologies (e.g. right-wing). These narratives all blend together and foster their path into extremism and eventually to the concrete perpetration of acts of violence. As for other ideologies, the consumption of online propaganda leads as well to the individual radicalisation of lone perpetrators.

Concluded court proceedings for other and not specified types of terrorism

The court proceedings for other and not specified forms of terrorism concluded in 2024 that were reported to Eurojust resulted in 28 convictions and 11 acquittals.

³⁶ As part of the execution of an arrest warrant by Poland.

ANNEXES

Amendments to national legislation on terrorism in 2024

Austria

The Austrian National Socialist Prohibition Act 1947 was amended by [Federal Law Gazette I, No. 177/2023](#). The amendments entered into force on 1 January 2024.

The main amendments concern the following:

- the extension of Austrian jurisdiction to conducts committed abroad, but at the same time declining a universal jurisdiction;
- a stronger differentiation of elements of the offences regulated under §§ 3g and 3h of the Nationalist Socialist Prohibition Act 1947 and a selective intensification of the penalty range accompanied by a more precise definition of the offences and clarifications;
- introduction of a mandatory loss of office for civil servants in the event of a final conviction for a criminal offence covered by the Nationalist Prohibition Act 1947;
- introduction of the possibility to confiscate Nazi propaganda material even without a connection to a specific punishable offence.

The full law as applicable today can be found here: [RIS - Verbotsgesetz 1947 - Bundesrecht konsolidiert, Fassung vom 20.01.2025](#)

Belgium

Article 17 of the Law of 18 January 2024 to make justice more humane, faster and punitive III replaces Article 141*bis* the Criminal Code, which defines the scope of the title on terrorist offences.

This amendment clarifies the relationship between the rules of international humanitarian law and the provisions on the criminal punishment of terrorism. It also clarifies the rules of application and interpretation of Article 141*bis*.

The purpose of the new text is to:

- enable cumulative prosecutions for war crimes and terrorist offences;
- prevent the impunity of individuals responsible for terrorist crimes;
- safeguard the application of international humanitarian law, and
- in case of conflict with other laws, preserve the primacy of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict.

Croatia

Article 98 of the Croatian Criminal Code was amended to clarify the meaning of “funds” in the provisions on financing of terrorism in accordance with a special law prescribing measures, actions and procedures for the purpose of preventing and detecting the financing of terrorism. Furthermore, the provisions on money laundering in Article 265 were amended to criminalise the acquisition of property as a result of a criminal offence committed in a foreign country even if the criminal offence is not punishable under the law of the country in which it was committed.

Estonia

Paragraph 1 of Article 237-2. Preparation of and incitement to acts of terrorism of the Estonian Criminal Code was amended in 2024. As a result, the incitement for the commission of terrorism acts does not have to be public anymore in order to be punishable.

Finland

Act 19.12.2024/923 introduced a new terrorist offence – female genital mutilation with terrorist intent – to the Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 34a Section 1 Item 6. A punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of two and a maximum of twelve years is foreseen.

Hungary

Act LIII of 2017 on the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing was amended several times in 2024 by the following acts:

- Act CXI of 2023, with phased entry into force between 1 January 2024 and 1 July 2024, which ensured compliance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, as well as Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU and Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market. Act CXI of 2023 also amended Act XLI of 2021 on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union to implement Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1231, and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1269.
- Act IX of 2024 on the amendment of certain acts on economy and property management, with phased entry into force between 25 April 2024 and 1 January 2025, intended to further comply with Directive (EU) 2015/849.
- Act XVIII of 2024 on amending the laws necessary to combat online fraud and other criminal laws, in force since 1 August 2024, which in its Article 29 establishes new procedural rules in cases of suspected fraud where the payment transaction was not intended to be authorised by the customer or was authorised by a customer in error.
- Act LVI of 2024 on the amendment of certain acts on finance and property management adding point 30a and point 38g to Article 3 of Act LIII of 2017, which among others names the Financial Intelligence Unit as the competent authority responsible for monitoring compliance with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing provisions as set out in Articles 8, 12, 17 and 21 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849. The amendments enter into force in three phases on 30 November 2024, 1 January 2025 and 1 July 2025.

Ireland

On 4 October 2024, in exercise of the powers conferred by subsections (2) and (6) of section 42 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 (No. 2 of 2005), and for the purpose of giving full effect to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001, the Minister of Finance signed Statutory Instrument SI 514/2024. The amended annex to this regulation lists Hamas and other groups as terrorist organisations for the purpose of S19 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939.

Italy

In Italy, several legal acts were amended in 2024. Those include the Law of 28 June 2024, n. 90 concerning the strengthening of the national cybersecurity, which entered into force on 17 July 2024, and Legislative Decree of 27 December 2024, n. 204 amending Italian law to transpose Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and the thereby amended Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. Furthermore, the provisions on organisation, procedures and internal controls aimed at preventing the use of intermediaries for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing of the Bank of Italy were amended on 27 November 2024 and published in the Official Journal no. 289 of 10 December 2024.

Latvia

Section 79.1 of the Criminal Law (Terrorism) has been amended, where in Paragraph one of the Section the words “to harm the interests of a State, its inhabitants or an international organisation” have been replaced by the words “to destabilise or undermine the political, constitutional, economic or social structure of a State, its inhabitants or an international organisation”. The amendments were adopted on 13 June 2024 and entered into force on 1 January 2025.

Lithuania

Further to Law No XIV-2488 dd. 14 March 2024 (in force since 16 March 2024) amendments of Articles 25 and 249-1 of the Criminal Code regulating forms of criminal complicity and liability for terrorist crimes were introduced. The amendments modify the concept of "terrorist group" (Article 25(3)), reduce the degree of threat posed by such groups and the evidential threshold for demonstrating their existence. The amendments introduce a new concept of "organised terrorist group" (Article 25(5)), which has been made equal to a “criminal association” and represents a form of criminal complicity posing the most serious threat. Based on the above, the provisions of Article 249-1 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code concerning the forming of a terrorist group or organised terrorist group and activities thereof were amended to reflect the threat caused by a terrorist group and an organised terrorist group and impose corresponding penalties.

Sweden

Law (2023:677) on the freezing of assets, which entered into force on 1 January 2024, provide a new possibility to freeze assets of persons who are suspected or convicted of terrorist offences. The law implements the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1337 (2001) and aims to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorism.

Terrorist attacks in 2024

Terrorist attacks in 2024 in the EU, as reported to Europol by Member States, per type of terrorism

	Jihadism	Right-wing	Left-wing and anarchist	Ethno-nationalist and separatist	Other	Grand total
Austria	3					3
Belgium	1					1
Czechia					2	2
Denmark					2	2
France	11			3		14
Germany	6					6
Greece			3			3
Ireland	1					1
Italy		1	18	1		20
Lithuania					2	2
Malta					1	1
Netherlands	1					1
Slovakia					1	1
Spain	1					1
Grand Total	24	1	21	4	8	58

Terrorist attacks in 2024 in the EU, as reported to Europol by Member States, per OUTCOME (completed, failed, foiled)

	Completed	Failed	Foiled	Total per country
Austria			3	3
Belgium			1	1
Czechia	1		1	2
Denmark	2			2
France	5		9	14
Germany	2		4	6
Greece	2	1		3
Ireland	1			1
Italy	17	3		20
Lithuania	1	1		2
Malta	1			1
Netherlands	1			1
Slovakia	1			1
Spain			1	1
Grand total	34	5	19	58

Arrests for terrorist offences in 2024

Arrests for terrorist offences in 2024, per type of terrorism, reported to Europol by Member States

	Jihadism	Right-wing	Left-wing and anarchist	Ethno-nationalist and separatist	Other	Total per country
Austria	22	0	0	0	0	22
Belgium	25	2	0	0	0	27
Cyprus	8	0	0	0	0	8
Czechia	3	1	0	0	1	5
Denmark	1	1	0	0	3	5
Finland	3	0	0	5	0	8
France	58	8	0	0	3	69
Germany	37	8	1	9	0	55
Greece	1	0	20	0	0	21
Hungary	1	3	0	0	2	6
Ireland	1	0	0	0	0	1
Italy	14	15	6	10	17	62
Latvia	2	1	0	0	0	3
Malta	3	0	0	0	1	4
Netherlands	23	7	0	0	10	40
Poland	1	0	0	0	12	13
Romania	1	0	0	0	0	1
Slovakia	0	1	0	0	1	2
Spain	78	0	1	3	8	90
Sweden	7	0	0	0	0	7
Grand Total	289	47	28	27	58	449

Convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences in 2024

This annex contains statistical information on the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2024, as reported to Eurojust.

Convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences per EU Member State in 2022, 2023³⁷ and 2024³⁸, as reported to Eurojust

MEMBER STATE	2022	2023	2024
AUSTRIA	48	39	64
BELGIUM	81	67	62
BULGARIA	-	-	1
CROATIA	-	1	-
CZECHIA	-	-	2
DENMARK	12	5	11
FINLAND	-	5	3
FRANCE	110	90	133
GERMANY	54	63	54
GREECE	1	2	-
HUNGARY	26	4	15
ITALY	21	5	29
LATVIA	1	-	1
NETHERLANDS	26	46	51
PORTUGAL	2	-	2
ROMANIA	2	1	-
SLOVAKIA	1	-	2
SPAIN	42	29	54
SWEDEN	4	1	1
TOTAL	431	358	485

³⁷ The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective EU TE-SAT reports, with the exception of the data for Denmark for 2022, which has been amended at the request of the Danish authorities.

³⁸ Eurojust received contributions containing information on terrorism-related convictions and acquittals in 2024 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden.

The concluded court proceedings in Hungary include a case in which a person was convicted in first instance but passed away before the court of appeal could rule on his appeal leading to the termination of the proceedings.

Convictions and acquittals in 2024 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust

Member state	Jihadist	Ethno-nationalist and separatist	Right wing	Left wing and anarchist	Other/Not specified	TOTAL
Austria	60	3	1	-	-	64
Belgium	61	-	1	-	-	62
Bulgaria	1	-	-	-	-	1
Czechia	1	1	-	-	-	2
Denmark	7	3	-	-	1	11
Finland	-	-	3	-	-	3
France	112	14	1	1	5	133
Germany	32	10	9	-	3	54
Hungary	1	-	-	-	14	15
Italy	16	-	10	-	3	29
Latvia	1	-	-	-	-	1
Netherlands	38	-	2	-	11	51
Portugal	2	-	-	-	-	2
Slovakia	-	-	1	-	1	2
Spain	30	23	-	-	1	54
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total	363	54	28	1	39	485

Convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2024, as reported to Eurojust³⁹

Member state	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Convictions in %
Austria	52	12	64	81 %
Belgium	53	9	62	85 %
Bulgaria	1	0	1	100 %
Czechia	2	0	2	100 %
Denmark	11	0	11	100 %
Finland	1	2	3	33 %
France	131	2	133	98 %
Germany	51	3	54	94 %
Hungary	14	1	15	93 %
Italy	22	7	29	76 %
Latvia	1	0	1	100 %
Netherlands	32	19	51	63 %
Portugal	2	0	2	100 %
Slovakia	2	0	2	100 %
Spain	50	4	54	93 %
Sweden	1	0	1	100 %
Total	426	59	485	88 %

Convictions and acquittals per type of terrorism in 2024, as reported to Eurojust

Type of terrorism	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Convictions in %
Jihadist	320	43	363	88 %
Ethno-nationalist and separatist	53	1	54	98 %
Right-wing	24	4	28	86 %
Left-wing and anarchist	1	0	1	100 %
Other/not specified	28	11	39	72 %
Total	426	59	485	88 %

³⁹ The concluded court proceedings in Hungary include a case in which a person was convicted in first instance but passed away before the court of appeal could rule on his appeal leading to the termination of the proceedings.

EUROPOL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was established at Europol, in early 2016, to ensure a coherent and comprehensive response to the constantly changing terrorist threat in the EU. To enhance the capabilities of the EU counter terrorism (CT) authorities, the ECTC builds on already existing tools, at Europol, and develops new ones to address the emerging needs of its stakeholders. The ECTC's established CT networks also facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices, thus supporting competent authorities in their fight against terrorism.

Recent and current events at a global scale have a significant impact on the CT landscape. The ECTC actively monitors these events as well as their impact on the online dimension, in order to offer solutions to the challenges that Member States face.

The ECTC's support to Member States often involves the facilitation of contacts with CT Units from non-EU countries, either in the context of the CT Joint Liaison Team or through outreach activities in countries neighbouring the EU, especially in the Western Balkans or the MENA region. In addition, the ECTC facilitates contacts with other EU JHA agencies and international organisations with a counter-terrorism mandate, as well as with private parties.

The Counter Terrorism Programme Board (CTPB), composed of representatives of the Heads of CT law enforcement agencies of the Member States and Schengen-associated countries, ensures the implementation by the ECTC of the operational activities related to the needs of the Member States. The CTPB reports to and receives strategic direction from the Heads of Counter-Terrorism in Member States and Schengen-associated countries.

The CTPB was established in 2017 with the purpose to function as a governance mechanism to the ECTC: by identifying the priority areas and concerns for CT, thus enabling ECTC to allocate the appropriate resources and to align its operational capabilities and services. The Programme Board membership is composed of volunteering countries (currently increased to 18).

The EU terrorism-related information hub

The main task of the ECTC is to facilitate the exchange of CT information among law enforcement authorities (LEAs) from all Member States and third parties. Requests for support continue to increase, spanning the whole ideological spectrum, including new forms of terrorism. This information exchange is facilitated by Europol's Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA). The exchange platform enables swift, secure and user-friendly communication and exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information. It responds to a multi-level security requirement and is available for the exchange of information on different classification levels, with a strong focus on interoperability with other systems at Europol and other cooperating States and organisations.

The ECTC adds value to the collected information by processing and analysing it and linking it in a timely manner to other relevant information available in our databases, thus facilitating the identification of links between investigations in different Member States and enabling co-operation between the respective CT units. In addition, the ECTC provides its stakeholders with OSINT expertise in the course of their CT investigations. To this end, ECTC's specialised units can collect information in a timely manner and

provide high quality intelligence and analytical support relevant to the ongoing investigations.

In addition, the ECTC can support the establishment of Operational Task Forces (OTFs). The OTFs are dedicated groups that are formed on a temporary basis with representatives from Member States' CT units and the ECTC, with a mandate to carry out a specific project or task. Through the OTFs, the ECTC coordinates intelligence and investigative efforts focused on the terrorism-related activities of one or more selected high-value targets and members of their CT network. Over the course of 2024, 7 different OTFs have been either created or extended, both in the field of cases concerning Jihadist terrorism, including the management of lists of foreign terrorist fighters for the creation of alerts in the SIS II, cases involving terrorist financing as well as investigations in the remit of domestic violent extremism. Last but not least, OTFs have been targeting cases of Core International Crimes, to assist the efforts of MS dealing with atrocities committed in the UA soil as well as investigations focussing different conflict zones.

At the forefront of law enforcement innovation and research

The ECTC has key strategic support capabilities that are able to identify European-wide CT implications and promote liaison with relevant international partners.

ECTC's expertise in all aspects of terrorism provides Member States with an insight and a better understanding of current and emerging terrorist threats, as well as an overview of the situation in areas of the world that are of interest or of concern to them. This, in turn, enables decision-making at strategic and policy level and provides guidance for tactical and operational actions.

In addition, the ECTC has established a wide network of partners to discuss new developments in terrorism and to exchange best practices in countering terrorist threats, to ensure that the best policy advice is provided.

The ECTC also recognises that academic research on CT-related issues can provide important benefits to law enforcement strategies and practices. To this end, the ECTC maintains the ECTC Advisory Network on terrorism and propaganda, whose annual conference serves as a platform for direct contact and exchange between the two fields.

The ECTC's expert reports, which are available to Member States and third parties as well as to Online Service Providers (OSPs), enable them to improve their content detection, analysis and moderation of Terrorism Content Online.

In addition, the ECTC offers its support through the SIRIUS project to meet the needs of Member States' competent authorities to have access to cross-border electronic evidence. The SIRIUS project, co-implemented by Europol and Eurojust, addresses the complexity of cross-border access to electronic evidence in criminal investigations. With OSPs often based in non-EU jurisdictions, with their fragmented co-operation policies and lengthy and cumbersome legal procedures for accessing data, it is challenging for EU law enforcement to make timely and efficient progress in criminal investigations. In response to this and other related challenges, SIRIUS has established itself as a central hub for knowledge sharing on cross-border access to electronic evidence in the EU. Over the past five years of operations, SIRIUS has become the go-to source of information for EU investigators seeking assistance to prepare direct data requests to foreign-based OSPs, as well as an essential reference point for EU judicial authorities seeking guidance on data acquisition methods in cross-border circumstances.

Security in partnership - bringing together relevant partners for cross-border cooperation and joint action and delivering agile, real-time operational support

The ECTC provides tailored support to Member States' investigations with a wide range of services and products.

A huge effort from ECTC side is to ensure systematic on the spot support in relation to action days, when Counter Terrorism units in the MS execute specific measures and conduct arrests and house searches: this is to tailor the operational support based on the specific operational needs of the single country, to ideally complement the range of available capabilities and expertise. The number of action days supported has been significant also during 2024, showing the appreciation of the stakeholders which can also include the testimony in front of the Court, to reinforce the evidentiary package gathered during the pre-trial phase. Furthermore, support on the spot has been ensured also during major events, such as the Olympic Games in Paris, the Eurovision Song Contest and during the Nordic Summit in Iceland, all outstanding examples of how the operational set up at national level, to maximize the preventive efforts, is now more and more relying on ECTC support.

The ECTC's dedicated teams of CT specialists and analysts deliver operational analysis in support of the investigations conducted by the competent authorities of the Member States and third parties, harnessing facial recognition technology and specific data analysis techniques, such as link analysis, social network analysis, geospatial analysis and timeline analysis. Member States are also supported in the online dimension of their investigations allowing them to generate new leads based on the information retrieved from the suspects' online communications and open sources. In addition, the ECTC uses the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) for the broader purposes of detecting terrorism financing, tracing terrorist money flows and supporting efforts to uncover terrorist cells.

To enhance the ability of the Member States to mitigate and address challenges posed by CBRN and explosive incidents, the ECTC has developed a CBRN-E capability to support the competent authorities in their relevant investigations. The CBRN & Explosives Team conducts technical analyses of bomb-making procedures and the illicit use of explosives, and is readily available to be deployed to provide on-the-spot support to ongoing investigations. The team also reports on relevant emerging trends and threats, provides Europol's partners with timely and pertinent expertise on CBRN-E issues and organises trainings and conferences. Additionally, the team acts as the secretariat for the European Explosives Ordnance Disposal Network (EODN).

At the request of the competent authorities in the Member States, the ECTC can deploy a multi-disciplinary team to provide on-site operational support in terrorism investigations. The deployed team of CT experts provides tailor-made services, including criminal analysis, on-the-spot technical support (e.g. digital forensics and facial recognition), CBRN-E expertise, financial or open-source intelligence (OSINT) and propaganda expertise. ECTC experts can also be deployed on action days or during major international events.

To facilitate timely engagement and cooperation on CT related matters, the ECTC hosts the Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team (CT JLT), which is composed of CT experts from the Member States and third parties with operational agreements represented at Europol's HQ. The CT JLT meets weekly at Europol's premises and provides a trusted environment where information can be shared swiftly, securely and efficiently. Over the course of 2024 the platform has increased the number of Countries represented and the quality of the operational engagement has significantly risen both in terms of duration of the meetings and in terms of updated operational information being shared within and off core hours.

The ECTC's support to its counterparts goes beyond the capabilities available within the department, as it has access to the expertise of the other Europol Operational Centres, to provide the best possible services to them in the course of their investigations.

The operational engagement with MS is also enhanced through the annual organisation of four different action weeks, called Terrorist Identification Task Force, a format that was launched in 2019 and has seen so far the organisation of 14 editions, each and all of them focussing on a specific CT phenomenon, that is of particular interest depending on the threat assessment and also based on the specific requests highlighted by the MS

during CT JLT meetings. This format ensure the participation of investigators from 7-8 different countries, who are hosted in EP premises for an entire week, and the goal is to exploit the specific CT case brought by each delegation and falling in a chosen CT domain. During the week, an analyst from ECTC develops all the possible cross checking, also facilitating bilateral and multilateral meetings among the delegations, who have also the opportunity to exploit the wider CT community present in house. Moreover, the delegations can receive presentations on ad hoc topics, such as ON LINE investigations by EU IRU, terrorist financing by TFTP team, crypto currency investigations from EC3 experts, as well as dedicated sessions on topics of interest. The result is a significant closing of the intelligence gaps, an increased awareness on Europol capabilities, enhanced networking at international level and an overall advancement of the specific CT investigation, thanks to the operational engagement during the week. Over the course of 2024, 4 different TIFs editions have been organised, focussing on 4 different CT topics of interest.

A platform for European policing solutions

The ECTC actively addresses the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda and the use of social media for radicalisation purposes. The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU), as an integral part of the ECTC, coordinates EU efforts to combat the dissemination of terrorist propaganda online, including through the organisation of joint Referral Action Days (RAD). The Unit provides operational support to CT cases with an online component and develops tools and techniques to detect and deter terrorist misuse of the internet.

The EU IRU 's prevention strategy continues to focus on the close engagement with Member States and OSPs to exchange best practices and expertise, and enhance the streamlining of referral processes. In addition, the EU IRU uses specialised linguistic and subject matter expertise to detect threats and claims of responsibility for attacks against EU and non-EU countries. The Unit also collects new propaganda content for referral to OSPs with a request for voluntary review against their terms of reference. Terrorist propaganda releases are also exploited for the purpose of strategic analysis.

The restricted SIRIUS platform on the Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) offers its knowledge to more than 8 000 members from law enforcement and judicial communities, representing a total of 47 countries worldwide. This includes representatives from all Member States, as well as countries with operational/working agreements with Europol and international or cooperation agreements with Eurojust, forming one of the largest communities on the EPE. SIRIUS activities include guidelines and best practices on the direct engagement with more than 70 OSPs as well as legal and policy review documentation; more than 50 IT tools to support investigators; training activities and capture the flags exercises. The Project also organises international conferences and workshops to bring together public and private stakeholders handling electronic evidence.

With the adoption of the EU Electronic Evidence legislative package, SIRIUS will further solidify its position as an internationally recognised actor that looks at the future of electronic evidence and shares knowledge and expertise on digital cross-border investigations.

Europol plays a central role in assisting EU Member States in the implementation of the TCO Regulation. The EU IRU works in close co-operation with Member States and the European Commission on the use and further development of PERCI, the technical solution to facilitate the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on the dissemination of terrorist content online. We coordinate Member States' activities to prevent duplication of efforts and avoid interference with national investigations. Since its launch in July 2023, PERCI coordinates the issuance of referrals and the transmission of removal orders to hosting service providers while safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms.

PERCI is the first cloud-based tool with privacy and security by design. It is the first web-based, collaborative tool that allows for real-time communication between users in the Member States and Europol working to combat the distribution of illegal content online. At present, competent authorities from 25 EU Member States have created over 350 user accounts in PERCI. In 2024, Member States and Europol sent 31 762 referrals via PERCI, targeting illegal content disseminated online by terrorist networks and their supporters. During the same period, the Member States designated authorities for the TCO implementation issued 1 022 Removal Orders, via PERCI, targeting terrorist content online.

The EU IRU is a key stakeholder in the EU Internet Forum (EUIF), launched in 2015 by the EU Commission to address the abuse of the internet for terrorist purposes whilst safeguarding fundamental rights. The Forum enhances public-private partnerships and promotes a coordinated EU-wide approach to reduce accessibility to various types of illegal content on the internet.

Annual transparency reports are issued by the EU IRU, providing snapshot of the units' activities aimed at reducing public access to terrorist content online (TCO). The report also outlines EU IRU's activities in support of the implementation of the Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (TCO Regulation), which became applicable in all EU Member States on 7 June 2022.

In order to address current or emerging security threats, the ECTC initiates the creation of working groups comprising CT experts from Europol and the Member States. The working groups draw on the expertise of their members in order to find solutions to pressing CT-related challenges that are of interest to different EU MS.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Artificial Intelligence
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
ASMLA	Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz
CBRN-E	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
CDKs	Kurdish Democratic Centers
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CSAM	Child Sexual Abuse Material
CT	Counter Terrorism
CT JLT	Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team
CTPB	Counter Terrorism Programme Board
DHKP-C	The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi)
DR	Dissident Republicans
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
E2EE	End-to-end Encryption
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
EEODN	European Explosives Ordnance Disposal Network
EPE	Europol Platform for Experts
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
EUIF	EU Internet Forum
EU IRU	European Union Internet Referral Unit
EU JHA	European Union Justice and Home Affairs Council
FLNC	Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GCC	Ghjuventù Clandestina Corsa
HTS	Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
HQ	Head Quarters
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IID	Improvised Incendiary Device
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IS	Islamic State
ISCAP	IS Central Africa Province
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
ISMP	IS Mozambique Province

ISSP	IS Sahel Province
IT	Information Technology
IVTS	Informal Value Transfer Systems
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin
LEAs	Law Enforcement Authorities
LGBTQ+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
LLM	Large Language Model
MENA	Middle East North Africa
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFT	Non-Fungible Tokens
NIRA	New Irish Republican Army
ONH	Óglaigh na hÉireann
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
OSP	Online Service Providers
OTF	Operational Task Force
PKK	Partiva Karkerên Kurdistanê
PKK/KCK	Partiva Karkerên Kurdistanê / Koma Civakên Kurdistan
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
RAC	Rock Against Communism
RAD	Referral Action Days
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SIENA	Secure Information Exchange Network Application
TATP	Triacetone triperoxide
TCO	Terrorist Content Online
TFTP	Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme
TKP/ML	Communist Party of Türkiye/Marxist–Leninist
TLP	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan
TOR	The Onion Router browser
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force
VPN	Virtual Private Network



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